Pievani Telmo
Department of Biology, University of Padua, Padova, Italy,
J Biosci. 2014 Apr;39(2):319-25. doi: 10.1007/s12038-013-9345-4.
Outlined here is an updated review of the long-standing 'kin selection vs group selection' debate. Group selection is a highly contentious concept, scientifically and philosophically. In 2012, Dawkins' attack against Wilson's latest book about eusociality concentrated all the attention on group selection and its mutual exclusivity with respect to inclusive fitness theory. Both opponents seem to be wrong, facing the general consensus in the field, which favours a pluralistic approach. Historically, despite some misunderstandings in current literature, such a perspective is clearly rooted in Darwin's writings, which suggested a plurality of levels of selection and a general view that we propose to call 'imperfect selfishness'. Today, the mathematically updated hypothesis of group selection has little to do with earlier versions of 'group selection'. It does not imply ontologically unmanageable notions of 'groups'. We propose here population structure as the main criterion of compatibility between kin selection and group selection. The latter is now evidently a pattern among others within a more general 'multilevel selection' theory. Different explanations and patterns are not mutually exclusive. Such a Darwinian pluralism is not a piece of the past, but a path into the future. A challenge in philosophy of biology will be to figure out the logical structure of this emerging pluralistic theory of evolution in such contentious debates.
本文概述了关于长期存在的“亲缘选择与群体选择”之争的最新综述。群体选择在科学和哲学上都是一个极具争议的概念。2012年，道金斯对威尔逊关于超个体社会性的新书的抨击，将所有注意力都集中在了群体选择及其与广义适合度理论的相互排斥性上。面对该领域支持多元方法的普遍共识，双方的观点似乎都是错误的。从历史角度看，尽管当前文献存在一些误解，但这种观点显然植根于达尔文的著作，这些著作提出了多个选择层次以及一种我们提议称为“不完美的自私”的总体观点。如今，经过数学更新的群体选择假说与早期版本的“群体选择”几乎没有关系。它并不意味着在本体论上难以处理的“群体”概念。我们在此提出，种群结构是亲缘选择与群体选择之间兼容性的主要标准。现在，群体选择显然是更广义的“多层次选择”理论中的一种模式。不同的解释和模式并非相互排斥。这种达尔文式的多元论并非过去的事物，而是通向未来的一条道路。在生物学哲学中面临的一个挑战将是，在这种有争议的辩论中弄清楚这种新兴的多元进化理论的逻辑结构。
