Martin Christopher Flynn, Bhui Rahul, Bossaerts Peter, Matsuzawa Tetsuro, Camerer Colin
Department of Brain and Behavioral Sciences, Kyoto University Primate Research Institute, Inuyama, Aichi 484-8506, Japan.
Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Caltech, Pasadena CA 91125, USA.
Sci Rep. 2014 Jun 5;4:5182. doi: 10.1038/srep05182.
The capacity for strategic thinking about the payoff-relevant actions of conspecifics is not well understood across species. We use game theory to make predictions about choices and temporal dynamics in three abstract competitive situations with chimpanzee participants. Frequencies of chimpanzee choices are extremely close to equilibrium (accurate-guessing) predictions, and shift as payoffs change, just as equilibrium theory predicts. The chimpanzee choices are also closer to the equilibrium prediction, and more responsive to past history and payoff changes, than two samples of human choices from experiments in which humans were also initially uninformed about opponent payoffs and could not communicate verbally. The results are consistent with a tentative interpretation of game theory as explaining evolved behavior, with the additional hypothesis that chimpanzees may retain or practice a specialized capacity to adjust strategy choice during competition to perform at least as well as, or better than, humans have.
对于不同物种中与收益相关的同种个体行为进行战略思考的能力，目前尚未得到充分理解。我们运用博弈论对黑猩猩参与的三种抽象竞争情境中的选择和时间动态进行预测。黑猩猩的选择频率与均衡（准确猜测）预测极为接近，并且会随着收益变化而改变，正如均衡理论所预测的那样。与人类在最初也不了解对手收益且无法进行口头交流的实验中的两个样本相比，黑猩猩的选择也更接近均衡预测，并且对过去的历史和收益变化更具响应性。这些结果与将博弈论初步解释为进化行为的观点一致，同时还有一个额外的假设，即黑猩猩可能保留或具备一种特殊能力，在竞争中调整策略选择，其表现至少与人类相当，甚至优于人类。
