Rusch Hannes
Behavioral and Institutional Economics, JLU Giessen, Licher Strasse 66, 35394, Giessen, Germany,
Hum Nat. 2014 Sep;25(3):359-77. doi: 10.1007/s12110-014-9199-y.
Building on and partially refining previous theoretical work, this paper presents an extended simulation model of ancestral warfare. This model (1) disentangles attack and defense, (2) tries to differentiate more strictly between selfish and altruistic efforts during war, (3) incorporates risk aversion and deterrence, and (4) pays special attention to the role of brutality. Modeling refinements and simulation results yield a differentiated picture of possible evolutionary dynamics. The main observations are: (a) Altruism in this model is more likely to evolve for defenses than for attacks. (b) Risk aversion, deterrence, and the interplay of migration levels and brutality can change evolutionary dynamics substantially. (c) Unexpectedly, one occasional simulation outcome is a dynamically stable state of "tolerated intergroup theft," raising the question as to whether corresponding patterns also exist in real intergroup conflicts. Finally, possible implications for theories of the coevolution of bellicosity and altruism in humans are discussed.
在以往理论工作的基础上并对其进行部分完善，本文提出了一个扩展的祖先战争模拟模型。该模型（1）区分了攻击和防御，（2）试图在战争期间更严格地区分自私和利他行为，（3）纳入了风险规避和威慑因素，（4）特别关注残暴行为的作用。模型的完善和模拟结果呈现出一幅关于可能的进化动态的差异化图景。主要观察结果如下：（a）在该模型中，利他行为在防御方面比在攻击方面更有可能进化。（b）风险规避、威慑以及迁移水平和残暴行为的相互作用会极大地改变进化动态。（c）出乎意料的是，偶尔会出现一种“容忍群体间盗窃”的动态稳定状态，这就引发了一个问题，即相应模式在现实群体间冲突中是否也存在。最后，讨论了对人类好战性和利他主义共同进化理论的可能影响。
