DeScioli Peter, Massenkoff Maxim, Shaw Alex, Petersen Michael Bang, Kurzban Robert
Department of Political Science, Stony Brook University, Stony Brook, NY, USA
Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, CA, USA.
Proc Biol Sci. 2014 Dec 22;281(1797). doi: 10.1098/rspb.2014.2112.
Previous research emphasizes people's dispositions as a source of differences in moral views. We investigate another source of moral disagreement, self-interest. In three experiments, participants played a simple economic game in which one player divides money with a partner according to the principle of equality (same payoffs) or the principle of equity (pay-offs proportional to effort expended). We find, first, that people's moral judgment of an allocation rule depends on their role in the game. People not only prefer the rule that most benefits them but also judge it to be more fair and moral. Second, we find that participants' views about equality and equity change in a matter of minutes as they learn where their interests lie. Finally, we find limits to self-interest: when the justification for equity is removed, participants no longer show strategic advocacy of the unequal division. We discuss implications for understanding moral debate and disagreement.
先前的研究强调人的性格是道德观念差异的一个来源。我们研究道德分歧的另一个来源,即自身利益。在三个实验中,参与者玩了一个简单的经济游戏,其中一名玩家根据平等原则(相同收益)或公平原则(收益与付出的努力成正比)与伙伴分配金钱。我们首先发现,人们对分配规则的道德判断取决于他们在游戏中的角色。人们不仅更喜欢最有利于自己的规则,而且认为它更公平、更道德。其次,我们发现,参与者对平等和公平的看法在几分钟内就会随着他们了解自身利益所在而发生变化。最后,我们发现了自身利益的局限性:当公平的理由被消除时,参与者不再表现出对不平等分配的策略性支持。我们讨论了这对于理解道德辩论和分歧的意义。