Fatas Enrique, Mateu Guillermo
School of Economics, University of East Anglia Norwich, UK.
Laboratory for Social Sciences and Behavioral Analysis, Finance, Control, and Law Department, Burgundy School of Business Dijon, France.
Front Behav Neurosci. 2015 Apr 29;9:107. doi: 10.3389/fnbeh.2015.00107. eCollection 2015.
The effect of sanctions on cooperation depends on social and cultural norms. While free riding is kept at bay by altruistic punishment in certain cultures, antisocial punishment carried out by free riders pushes back cooperation in others. In this paper we analyze sanctions in both a standard public goods game with a linear production function and an otherwise identical social dilemma in which the minimum contribution determines the group outcome. Experiments were run in a culture with traditionally high antisocial punishment (Southern Europe). We replicate the detrimental effect of antisocial sanctions on cooperation in the linear case. However, we find that punishment is still widely effective when actions are complementary: the provision of the public good significantly and substantially increases with sanctions, participants punish significantly less and sanctions radically transform conditional cooperation patterns to generate significant welfare gains.
制裁对合作的影响取决于社会和文化规范。在某些文化中，利他惩罚抑制了搭便车行为，而搭便车者实施的反社会惩罚则在其他文化中阻碍了合作。在本文中，我们在一个具有线性生产函数的标准公共品博弈以及一个其他方面相同但由最低贡献决定群体结果的社会困境中分析制裁。实验在一个传统上反社会惩罚程度较高的文化环境（南欧）中进行。我们在具有线性情况的实验中重现了反社会制裁对合作的不利影响。然而，我们发现当行动具有互补性时，惩罚仍然具有广泛的效力：随着制裁的实施，公共品的提供显著且大幅增加，参与者的惩罚显著减少，制裁从根本上改变了有条件合作模式，从而产生了显著的福利收益。
