Pearson Joel, Kosslyn Stephen M
School of Psychology, University of New South Wales, Sydney, NSW 2052, Australia;
Minerva Schools at Keck Graduate Institute, San Francisco, CA 94103.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2015 Aug 18;112(33):10089-92. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1504933112. Epub 2015 Jul 14.
The possible ways that information can be represented mentally have been discussed often over the past thousand years. However, this issue could not be addressed rigorously until late in the 20th century. Initial empirical findings spurred a debate about the heterogeneity of mental representation: Is all information stored in propositional, language-like, symbolic internal representations, or can humans use at least two different types of representations (and possibly many more)? Here, in historical context, we describe recent evidence that humans do not always rely on propositional internal representations but, instead, can also rely on at least one other format: depictive representation. We propose that the debate should now move on to characterizing all of the different forms of human mental representation.
在过去的一千年里,人们经常讨论信息在大脑中可能的表征方式。然而,直到20世纪后期,这个问题才得以被严谨地探讨。最初的实证研究结果引发了一场关于心理表征异质性的辩论:所有信息都是存储在命题式、类似语言的符号内部表征中,还是人类至少可以使用两种不同类型的表征(甚至可能更多)?在此,我们将结合历史背景,描述最近的证据,即人类并非总是依赖命题式内部表征,而是至少还可以依赖另一种形式:描绘性表征。我们建议,现在这场辩论应转向对人类心理表征的所有不同形式进行特征描述。