Pearce N, Crawford-Brown D
Department of Community Health, Wellington School of Medicine, Wellington Hospital, New Zealand.
J Clin Epidemiol. 1989;42(3):177-84. doi: 10.1016/0895-4356(89)90053-x.
There has been a renewed interest in the philosophical and scientific basis of epidemiology in recent years. In particular, it has been argued that Popper's philosophy should be adopted by epidemiologists, an assertion that has met with some scepticism. However, most criticisms of Popper's approach have been from an inductivist viewpoint, concerned with the generation of theories, whereas Popper's concern is with the testing of theories, and the two schools have been largely "talking past each other". We present a critique of Popper from within his own domain of interest. Examples are presented to show that Popper's philosophy is incomplete even for the physical sciences on which it is based, and that it is particularly inappropriate for epidemiology. Popper's approach makes sense only under the narrow way he has chosen to define science, and thus provides only a possible answer to a small set of fundamental problems of science and its use in society. The recent Popperian "trend" has a positive aspect in that it has fostered deductive thinking, and exposed the shortcomings of induction. However, the restrictive Popperian framework actually inhibits discussion despite its veneer of "critical discussion". A more pluralistic approach is needed at this stage of the development of epidemiology.
近年来，人们对流行病学的哲学和科学基础重新产生了兴趣。特别是，有人认为流行病学家应该采用波普尔的哲学，这一主张遭到了一些怀疑。然而，对波普尔方法的大多数批评都来自归纳主义观点，关注理论的产生，而波普尔关注的是理论的检验，这两个学派在很大程度上一直是“各说各话”。我们从波普尔自己感兴趣的领域对他进行批判。文中给出了一些例子，以表明即使对于波普尔哲学所基于的物理科学来说，它也是不完整的，对于流行病学来说尤其不合适。波普尔的方法只有在他所选择的定义科学的狭隘方式下才有意义，因此它只为一小部分科学及其在社会中的应用的基本问题提供了一个可能的答案。最近的波普尔主义“潮流”有一个积极的方面，即它促进了演绎思维，并揭示了归纳法的缺点。然而，尽管波普尔主义框架有“批判性讨论”的表象，但它实际上限制了讨论。在流行病学发展的现阶段，需要一种更加多元化的方法。
