Tetlock P E, Skitka L, Boettger R
University of California, Berkeley.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 1989 Oct;57(4):632-40. doi: 10.1037//0022-3514.57.4.632.
This experiment tested predictions derived from a social contingency model of judgment and choice that identifies 3 distinctive strategies that people rely on in dealing with demands for accountability from important interpersonal or institutional audiences. The model predicts that (a) when people know the views of the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they will rely on the low-effort acceptability heuristic and simply shift their views toward those of the prospective audience, (b) when people do not know the views of the audience and are unconstrained by past commitments, they will be motivated to think in relatively flexible, multidimensional ways (preemptive self-criticism), and (c) when people are accountable for positions to which they feel committed, they will devote the majority of their mental effort to justifying those positions (defensive bolstering). The experiment yielded results supportive of these 3 predictions. The study also revealed some evidence of individual differences in social and cognitive strategies for coping with accountability.
本实验检验了从一个判断与选择的社会权变模型得出的预测，该模型识别出人们在应对来自重要人际或机构受众的问责要求时所依赖的三种独特策略。该模型预测：（a）当人们了解受众的观点且不受过去承诺的约束时，他们会依赖低努力可接受性启发式，简单地将自己的观点转向潜在受众的观点；（b）当人们不了解受众的观点且不受过去承诺的约束时，他们会被激励以相对灵活、多维度的方式思考（先发制人的自我批评）；（c）当人们对自己认同的立场负责时，他们会将大部分脑力用于为这些立场辩护（防御性支持）。实验结果支持了这三个预测。该研究还揭示了一些关于应对问责的社会和认知策略存在个体差异的证据。
