Monjaraz Fuentes Paulina, Rojas Hernández María Del Carmen, Santasilia Stefano, Monjaraz Fuentes Fernanda
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities, Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí, México.
Faculty of Psychology, Universidad Autónoma de San Luis Potosí, San Luis Potosí, México.
Life Sci Soc Policy. 2017 Dec;13(1):6. doi: 10.1186/s40504-017-0051-0. Epub 2017 Apr 26.
The aim of this manuscript is to highlight that from the phenomenology and psychoanalysis point of view, the meaning of the notion of the body is different from the medical biologicist discourse. In psychoanalysis, the body is an erogenized body. It is constituted as an object for another self. Similarly, in phenomenology, the body is an own body in first instance. It is the body of a self, rather than a living body and a material body. Both positions enable us to understand how this conceptualization of the body is essential in any human field. Especially in the clinic, the position of the subject before the other will lead to a specific form of intervention. From this understanding of the human body, both phenomenology and psychoanalysis confirm that the biologicist understanding of the body, presumed by all psychological and medical practices, is insufficient.
本手稿的目的是强调，从现象学和精神分析的角度来看，身体概念的含义与医学生物学家的论述不同。在精神分析中，身体是一个性敏感化的身体。它被建构为另一个自我的对象。同样，在现象学中，身体首先是一个本己身体。它是自我的身体，而非活体和物质身体。这两种观点都使我们能够理解，这种身体概念化在任何人类领域都是至关重要的。尤其是在临床中，主体相对于他者的立场会导致一种特定的干预形式。从这种对人体的理解来看，现象学和精神分析都证实，所有心理学和医学实践所假定的生物学家对身体的理解是不充分的。
