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弗洛伊德《超越快乐原则》中遗失的东西:一种费伦齐式解读

Something Was Lost in Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle: A Ferenczian Reading.

作者信息

Soreanu Raluca

机构信息

Department of Psychosocial Studies, School of Social Science, History and Philosophy, Birkbeck, University of London, 26 Russell Square, Room 230, Bloomsbury, London, WC1B 5DQ, UK.

出版信息

Am J Psychoanal. 2017 Sep;77(3):223-238. doi: 10.1057/s11231-017-9105-6.

Abstract

Freud's Beyond the Pleasure Principle (1920) brought a lot of new possibilities to psychoanalytic theory, but also a series of losses. While I recognize the importance of the death drive as a metapsychological construct, I argue that the first thing that went missing with the arrival of this groundbreaking Freudian text is the theorization of the ego instincts or the self-preservative drives. Freud never articulated some plausible inheritors of the ego instincts. I follow the Budapest School, and especially the voice of Sándor Ferenczi, for addressing this loss. The second thing that went missing after Beyond the Pleasure Principle is our openness in thinking through repetition. With the seductive formulation of the "daemonic" repetition in this 1920 text, our theoretical imagination around repetition seems to have been affected. I draw on the work of Sándor Ferenczi for exploring new forms of repetition. Finally, I offer a Ferenczian re-reading of the Freudian Nachträglichkeit, which I see as crucial in the process of pluralizing our thinking on repetition.

摘要

弗洛伊德的《超越快乐原则》(1920年)给精神分析理论带来了诸多新的可能性,但也带来了一系列损失。虽然我认识到死亡驱力作为一种元心理学结构的重要性,但我认为随着弗洛伊德这部开创性著作的问世,首先缺失的是自我本能或自我保存驱力的理论阐述。弗洛伊德从未阐明自我本能的一些合理继承者。我追随布达佩斯学派,尤其是桑多尔·费伦齐的观点,来弥补这一缺失。《超越快乐原则》之后缺失的第二点是我们在思考重复时的开放性。随着1920年这部著作中对“恶魔般”重复的诱人表述,我们围绕重复的理论想象力似乎受到了影响。我借鉴桑多尔·费伦齐的著作来探索重复的新形式。最后,我对弗洛伊德的“延迟作用”进行了费伦齐式的重新解读,我认为这在使我们对重复的思考多元化的过程中至关重要。

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