Grupo Interdisciplinar de Sistemas Complejos, Departamento de Matemáticas, Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, 28911, Leganés, Madrid, Spain.
Middlesex University London, Department of Economics, Business School, Hendon Campus, The Burroughs, London, NW4 4BT, United Kingdom.
Sci Rep. 2017 Aug 29;7(1):9684. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-07712-9.
Expectations, exerting influence through social norms, are a very strong candidate to explain how complex societies function. In the Dictator game (DG), people expect generous behavior from others even if they cannot enforce any sharing of the pie. Here we assume that people donate following their expectations, and that they update their expectations after playing a DG by reinforcement learning to construct a model that explains the main experimental results in the DG. Full agreement with the experimental results is reached when some degree of mismatch between expectations and donations is added into the model. These results are robust against the presence of envious agents, but affected if we introduce selfish agents that do not update their expectations. Our results point to social norms being on the basis of the generous behavior observed in the DG and also to the wide applicability of reinforcement learning to explain many strategic interactions.
期望通过社会规范施加影响，是解释复杂社会如何运作的一个非常有力的候选因素。在独裁者博弈（DG）中，人们期望他人表现出慷慨的行为，即使他们无法强制分享馅饼。在这里，我们假设人们根据自己的期望进行捐赠，并且他们通过强化学习来更新自己的期望，以构建一个能够解释 DG 中主要实验结果的模型。当模型中加入一定程度的期望与捐赠之间的不匹配时，模型就能与实验结果完全吻合。这些结果在存在嫉妒代理的情况下是稳健的，但如果我们引入不更新期望的自私代理，它们就会受到影响。我们的结果表明，社会规范是 DG 中观察到的慷慨行为的基础，强化学习也广泛适用于解释许多策略互动。
