Carter Sarah
Bioethics. 2017 Nov;31(9):683-690. doi: 10.1111/bioe.12380. Epub 2017 Sep 5.
It seems, at first glance, that a Kantian ethics approach to moral enhancement would tend towards the position that there could be no place for emotional modulation in any understanding of the endeavour, owing to the typically understood view that Kantian ethics does not allow any role for emotion in morality as a whole. It seems then that any account of moral bioenhancement which places emotion at its centre would therefore be rejected. This article argues, however, that this assumption is incorrect. Given later writings by Kant on the role of sympathy, and taking into account other concerns in Kantian ethics (such as bodily integrity), it may in fact be the case that Kantian ethics would allow for an account of moral bioenhancement through emotional modulation, and that in some (rare) cases such an intervention might even be considered to be a duty.
乍一看,康德式伦理学对道德提升的探讨似乎倾向于这样一种立场:在对这一努力的任何理解中,情感调节都没有立足之地,因为通常的观点认为,康德式伦理学在整体道德中不允许情感发挥任何作用。那么,任何以情感为核心的道德生物增强的描述似乎都会被拒绝。然而,本文认为这一假设是错误的。鉴于康德后期关于同情作用的著作,并考虑到康德式伦理学中的其他问题(如身体完整性),实际上康德式伦理学可能会允许通过情感调节来进行道德生物增强的描述,而且在某些(罕见)情况下,这样的干预甚至可能被视为一种义务。