Department of Social Neuroscience, Max Planck Institute for Human Cognitive and Brain Sciences, Leipzig, Germany.
Kiel Institute for the World Economy, Kiel, Germany.
Sci Rep. 2017 Sep 11;7(1):11068. doi: 10.1038/s41598-017-11580-8.
Standard economic theory postulates that decisions are driven by stable context-insensitive preferences, while motivation psychology suggests they are driven by distinct context-sensitive motives with distinct evolutionary goals and characteristic psycho-physiological and behavioral patterns. To link these fields and test how distinct motives could differentially predict different types of economic decisions, we experimentally induced participants with either a Care or a Power motive, before having them take part in a suite of classic game theoretical paradigms involving monetary exchange. We show that the Care induction alone raised scores on a latent factor of cooperation-related behaviors, relative to a control condition, while, relative to Care, Power raised scores on a punishment-related factor. These findings argue against context-insensitive stable preferences and theories of strong reciprocity and in favor of a motive-based approach to economic decision making: Care and Power motivation have a dissociable fingerprint in shaping either cooperative or punishment behaviors.
标准经济理论假设决策是由稳定的不敏感于上下文的偏好驱动的，而动机心理学则表明决策是由不同的敏感于上下文的动机驱动的，这些动机具有不同的进化目标和独特的心理生理和行为模式。为了将这些领域联系起来并测试不同的动机如何可以不同地预测不同类型的经济决策，我们通过实验诱导参与者产生关爱或权力动机，然后让他们参与一系列涉及货币交换的经典博弈论范式。我们发现，与对照条件相比，关爱诱导单独提高了与合作相关行为的潜在因素的分数，而与关爱相比，权力诱导提高了与惩罚相关的因素的分数。这些发现反对不敏感于上下文的稳定偏好和强互惠理论，并支持基于动机的经济决策方法：关爱和权力动机在塑造合作或惩罚行为方面具有可分离的特征。
