Hysong Sylvia J, SoRelle Richard, Broussard Smitham Kristen, Petersen Laura A
Houston VA HSR&D Center for Innovations in Quality, Effectiveness and Safety, Michael E. DeBakey VA Medical Center, Houston, Texas, United States of America.
Department of Medicine, Baylor College of Medicine, Houston, Texas, United States of America.
PLoS One. 2017 Sep 21;12(9):e0184856. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0184856. eCollection 2017.
Given the increase in financial-incentive programs nationwide, many physicians and physician groups are concerned about potential unintended consequences of providing financial incentives to improve quality of care. However, few studies examine whether actual unintended consequences result from providing financial incentives to physicians. We sought to document the extent to which the unintended consequences discussed in the literature were observable in a randomized clinical trial (RCT) of financial incentives.
We conducted a qualitative observational study nested within a larger RCT of financial incentives to improve hypertension care. We conducted 30-minute telephone interviews with primary care personnel at facilities participating in the RCT housed at12 geographically dispersed Veterans Affairs Medical Centers nationwide. Participants answered questions about unintended effects, clinic team dynamics, organizational impact on care delivery, study participation. We employed a blend of inductive and deductive qualitative techniques for analysis.
Sixty-five participants were recruited from RCT enrollees and personnel not enrolled in the larger RCT, plus one primary care leader per site.
Emergent themes included possible patient harm, emphasis on documentation over improving care, reduced professional morale, and positive spillover. All discussions of unintended consequences involving patient harm were only concerns, not actual events. Several unintended consequences concerned ancillary initiatives for quality improvement (e.g., practice guidelines and performance measurement systems) rather than financial incentives.
Many unintended consequences of financial incentives noted were either only concerns or attributable to ancillary quality-improvement initiatives. Actual unintended consequences included improved documentation of care without necessarily improving actual care, and positive unintended consequences.
Clinicaltrials.gov Identifier: NCT00302718.
鉴于全国范围内经济激励项目的增加,许多医生和医生团体担心提供经济激励以改善医疗质量可能产生意想不到的后果。然而,很少有研究考察向医生提供经济激励是否真的会产生意想不到的后果。我们试图记录在一项经济激励的随机临床试验(RCT)中,文献中讨论的意想不到的后果在多大程度上是可观察到的。
我们在一项更大的旨在改善高血压护理的经济激励RCT中进行了一项定性观察研究。我们对参与该RCT的12个分布在全国各地的退伍军人事务医疗中心的基层医疗人员进行了30分钟的电话访谈。参与者回答了关于意外影响、诊所团队动态、组织对护理提供的影响、研究参与等问题。我们采用归纳和演绎相结合的定性技术进行分析。
从RCT参与者和未参与更大规模RCT的人员中招募了65名参与者,每个地点还包括一名基层医疗负责人。
出现的主题包括可能对患者造成的伤害、注重记录而非改善护理、职业士气下降以及积极的溢出效应。所有关于对患者造成伤害的意外后果的讨论都只是担忧,而非实际事件。一些意外后果涉及质量改进的辅助举措(如实践指南和绩效评估系统),而非经济激励。
所指出的经济激励的许多意外后果要么只是担忧,要么可归因于辅助性质量改进举措。实际的意外后果包括护理记录得到改善,但不一定改善实际护理情况,以及产生了积极的意外后果。
Clinicaltrials.gov标识符:NCT00302718。