Business School, University of Shanghai for Science and Technology, Shanghai 200093, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2017 Oct 25;14(11):1276. doi: 10.3390/ijerph14111276.
This paper studies the effect of uncertain demand on a low-carbon product by using a newsvendor model. With two different kinds of market scales, we examine a game whereby a manufacturer produces and delivers a single new low-carbon product to a single retailer. The retailer observes the demand information and gives an order before the selling season. We find in the game that if the retailer shares truthful (or in contrast unreal or even does not share) forecast information with the manufacturer, the manufacturer will give a low (high) wholesale price through the sequence of events. In addition, as a policy-maker, the government posts a subsidy by selling the low-carbon product per unit. The manufacturer creates a new contract with a rebate for the retailer. We also take the consumer aversion coefficient and truth coefficient as qualitative variables into our model to study the order, pricing, and expected profit for the members of supply chain. The research shows that uncertain demand causes a the major effect on the new low-carbon product. Thereby, we suggest the retailer should share more truthful information with the manufacturer.
本文运用报童模型研究了不确定需求对低碳产品的影响。通过两种不同的市场规模，我们研究了一个制造商向单个零售商生产和销售单一新型低碳产品的博弈。零售商在销售季节前观察需求信息并下达订单。我们发现，在游戏中，如果零售商与制造商分享真实（或相反不真实甚至不分享）的预测信息，制造商将通过事件序列给出低（高）的批发价格。此外，作为政策制定者，政府通过销售低碳产品的单位来提供补贴。制造商为零售商创建了一个带有回扣的新合同。我们还将消费者厌恶系数和真实系数作为定性变量纳入我们的模型，以研究供应链成员的订单、定价和预期利润。研究表明，不确定需求对新型低碳产品有重大影响。因此，我们建议零售商应与制造商分享更多真实信息。
