Philosophy and Cognitive Science, Graduate Center, City University of New York, 365 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10025, USA.
Neuropsychologia. 2019 May;128:255-265. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2018.01.018. Epub 2018 Feb 3.
It is natural to see conscious perceptions as typically bringing with them a degree of confidence about what is perceived. So one might also expect such confidence not to occur if a perception is not conscious. This has resulted in the use of confidence as a test or measure of consciousness, one that may be more reliable and fine-grained than the traditional appeal to subjective report as a test for a perception's being conscious. The following describes theoretical difficulties for the use of confidence as a reliable test for consciousness, which show that confidence is less reliable than subjective report. Difficulties are also presented for the use of confidence ratings in assessing degrees of consciousness, which cast doubt on any advantage confidence might have from being more fine-grained than subjective report. And an explanation is proposed for the wide appeal of using confidence to assess subjective awareness, an explanation that also makes clear why confidence is less reliable than subjective report.
将意识知觉视为通常伴随着对所感知事物的一定程度的确信，这是很自然的。因此，如果一种知觉不是有意识的，人们可能也不会期望这种确信会出现。这导致了将信心用作意识的测试或衡量标准，这种标准可能比传统的主观报告作为感知意识的测试更可靠和更精细。以下描述了将信心用作意识可靠测试的理论困难，这些困难表明信心不如主观报告可靠。也提出了在评估意识程度时使用信心评分的困难，这使得信心比主观报告更精细的优势受到质疑。并对使用信心来评估主观意识的广泛吸引力提出了一种解释，这种解释也清楚地表明了为什么信心不如主观报告可靠。
