Department of Psychology, University of Toronto.
Department of Sociology, Stanford University.
J Pers Soc Psychol. 2018 Feb;114(2):195-210. doi: 10.1037/pspa0000097.
While moral character heavily influences global evaluations of others (Goodwin, Piazza, & Rozin, 2014), its causal effect on perceptions of others' competence (i.e., one's knowledge, skills, and abilities) is less clear. We found that people readily use information about another's morality when judging their competence, despite holding folk intuitions that these domains are independent. Across 6 studies (n = 1,567), including 2 preregistered experiments, participants judged targets who committed hypothetical transgressions (Studies 1 and 3), cheated on lab tasks (Study 2), acted selfishly in economic games (Study 4), and received low morality ratings from coworkers (Study 5 and 6) as less competent than control or moral targets. These findings were specific to morality and were not the result of incidentally manipulating impressions of warmth (Study 4), nor were they fully explained by a general halo effect (Studies 2 and 3). We hypothesized that immoral targets are seen as less competent because their immoral actions led them to be viewed as low in social intelligence. Studies 4 and 5 supported this prediction, demonstrating that social intelligence was a more reliable mediator than perceptions of self-control or general intelligence. An experimental test of this mediation argument found that presenting targets as highly socially intelligent eliminated the negative effect of immoral information on judgments of competence (Study 6). These results suggest that information about a person's moral character readily influences perceptions of their competence. (PsycINFO Database Record
虽然道德品质对他人的全球评价有很大影响(Goodwin、Piazza 和 Rozin,2014),但其对他人能力(即知识、技能和能力)的感知的因果影响却不太清楚。我们发现,尽管人们持有这两个领域相互独立的民间直觉,但在判断他人的能力时,他们很容易利用他人道德方面的信息。在 6 项研究(n = 1567)中,包括 2 项预先注册的实验,参与者对犯下假设性违规行为的目标(研究 1 和 3)、在实验室任务中作弊的目标(研究 2)、在经济游戏中自私自利的目标(研究 4)以及从同事那里获得低道德评级的目标(研究 5 和 6)的能力评价低于对照组或道德目标。这些发现是特定于道德的,不是偶然操纵温暖印象的结果(研究 4),也不能完全用一般晕轮效应来解释(研究 2 和 3)。我们假设不道德的目标被认为能力较低,是因为他们不道德的行为使他们被视为社会智能低下。研究 4 和 5 支持了这一预测,表明社会智能是比自我控制或一般智力更可靠的中介变量。对这种中介论点的实验检验发现,将目标呈现为高度社会智能,消除了不道德信息对能力判断的负面影响(研究 6)。这些结果表明,关于一个人道德品质的信息很容易影响对其能力的看法。