Khemlani Sangeet S, Byrne Ruth M J, Johnson-Laird Philip N
Navy Center for Applied Research in Artificial Intelligence, US Naval Research Laboratory.
School of Psychology and Institute of Neuroscience, Trinity College Dublin, University of Dublin.
Cogn Sci. 2018 Jul 2. doi: 10.1111/cogs.12634.
This article presents a fundamental advance in the theory of mental models as an explanation of reasoning about facts, possibilities, and probabilities. It postulates that the meanings of compound assertions, such as conditionals (if) and disjunctions (or), unlike those in logic, refer to conjunctions of epistemic possibilities that hold in default of information to the contrary. Various factors such as general knowledge can modulate these interpretations. New information can always override sentential inferences; that is, reasoning in daily life is defeasible (or nonmonotonic). The theory is a dual process one: It distinguishes between intuitive inferences (based on system 1) and deliberative inferences (based on system 2). The article describes a computer implementation of the theory, including its two systems of reasoning, and it shows how the program simulates crucial predictions that evidence corroborates. It concludes with a discussion of how the theory contrasts with those based on logic or on probabilities.
本文介绍了心理模型理论的一项根本性进展，该理论用于解释关于事实、可能性和概率的推理。它假定，与逻辑中的含义不同，诸如条件句（如果）和析取句（或者）等复合断言的含义，指的是在没有相反信息的情况下成立的认知可能性的合取。诸如常识等各种因素可以调节这些解释。新信息总是可以推翻句子推理；也就是说，日常生活中的推理是可废止的（或非单调的）。该理论是一种双过程理论：它区分了直觉推理（基于系统1）和审慎推理（基于系统2）。本文描述了该理论的计算机实现，包括其两个推理系统，并展示了该程序如何模拟证据所证实的关键预测。文章最后讨论了该理论与基于逻辑或概率的理论有何不同。
