Whitford Christopher M, Dymek Saskia, Kerkhoff Denise, März Camilla, Schmidt Olga, Edich Maximilian, Droste Julian, Pucker Boas, Rückert Christian, Kalinowski Jörn
1Center for Biotechnology, Bielefeld University, 33615 Bielefeld, Germany.
2Faculty of Biology, Bielefeld University, Bielefeld, Germany.
J Biol Eng. 2018 Aug 14;12:13. doi: 10.1186/s13036-018-0105-8. eCollection 2018.
Biosafety is a key aspect in the international Genetically Engineered Machine (iGEM) competition, which offers student teams an amazing opportunity to pursue their own research projects in the field of Synthetic Biology. iGEM projects often involve the creation of genetically engineered bacterial strains. To minimize the risks associated with bacterial release, a variety of biosafety systems were constructed, either to prevent survival of bacteria outside the lab or to hinder horizontal or vertical gene transfer.
Physical containment methods such as bioreactors or microencapsulation are considered the first safety level. Additionally, various systems involving auxotrophies for both natural and synthetic compounds have been utilized by iGEM teams in recent years. Combinatorial systems comprising multiple auxotrophies have been shown to reduced escape frequencies below the detection limit. Furthermore, a number of natural toxin-antitoxin systems can be deployed to kill cells under certain conditions. Additionally, parts of naturally occurring toxin-antitoxin systems can be used for the construction of 'kill switches' controlled by synthetic regulatory modules, allowing control of cell survival. Kill switches prevent cell survival but do not completely degrade nucleic acids. To avoid horizontal gene transfer, multiple mechanisms to cleave nucleic acids can be employed, resulting in 'self-destruction' of cells. Changes in light or temperature conditions are powerful regulators of gene expression and could serve as triggers for kill switches or self-destruction systems. Xenobiology-based containment uses applications of Xeno-DNA, recoded codons and non-canonical amino acids to nullify the genetic information of constructed cells for wild type organisms. A 'minimal genome' approach brings the opportunity to reduce the genome of a cell to only genes necessary for survival under lab conditions. Such cells are unlikely to survive in the natural environment and are thus considered safe hosts. If suitable for the desired application, a shift to cell-free systems based on Xeno-DNA may represent the ultimate biosafety system.
Here we describe different containment approaches in synthetic biology, ranging from auxotrophies to minimal genomes, which can be combined to significantly improve reliability. Since the iGEM competition greatly increases the number of people involved in synthetic biology, we will focus especially on biosafety systems developed and applied in the context of the iGEM competition.
生物安全是国际遗传工程机器大赛(iGEM)的一个关键方面,该大赛为学生团队提供了一个在合成生物学领域开展自身研究项目的绝佳机会。iGEM项目通常涉及基因工程细菌菌株的创建。为了将与细菌释放相关的风险降至最低,构建了各种生物安全系统,以防止细菌在实验室外存活,或阻碍水平或垂直基因转移。
生物反应器或微囊化等物理限制方法被视为第一安全级别。此外,近年来iGEM团队还采用了各种涉及天然和合成化合物营养缺陷型的系统。包含多个营养缺陷型的组合系统已被证明能将逃逸频率降低到检测限以下。此外,可以部署许多天然毒素 - 抗毒素系统在某些条件下杀死细胞。另外,天然存在的毒素 - 抗毒素系统的部分元件可用于构建由合成调控模块控制的“杀伤开关”,从而实现对细胞存活的控制。杀伤开关可防止细胞存活,但不会完全降解核酸。为避免水平基因转移,可以采用多种切割核酸的机制,导致细胞“自我毁灭”。光照或温度条件的变化是强大的基因表达调节因子,可作为杀伤开关或自我毁灭系统的触发因素。基于异源生物学的限制利用异源DNA、重新编码的密码子和非规范氨基酸的应用来消除构建细胞对野生型生物的遗传信息。“最小基因组”方法带来了将细胞基因组减少到仅包含在实验室条件下生存所需基因的机会。这样的细胞不太可能在自然环境中存活,因此被视为安全宿主。如果适用于所需应用,转向基于异源DNA的无细胞系统可能代表最终的生物安全系统。
在此我们描述了合成生物学中不同的限制方法,从营养缺陷型到最小基因组,这些方法可以结合起来显著提高可靠性。由于iGEM大赛极大地增加了参与合成生物学的人数,我们将特别关注在iGEM大赛背景下开发和应用的生物安全系统。