Ramstead Maxwell J D, Friston Karl J, Hipólito Inês
Division of Social and Transcultural Psychiatry, Department of Psychiatry, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 1A1, Canada.
Culture, Mind, and Brain Program, McGill University, Montreal, QC H3A 1A1, Canada.
Entropy (Basel). 2020 Aug 13;22(8):889. doi: 10.3390/e22080889.
The aim of this paper is twofold: (1) to assess whether the construct of neural representations plays an explanatory role under the variational free-energy principle and its corollary process theory, active inference; and (2) if so, to assess which philosophical stance-in relation to the ontological and epistemological status of representations-is most appropriate. We focus on non-realist (deflationary and fictionalist-instrumentalist) approaches. We consider a deflationary account of mental representation, according to which the explanatorily relevant contents of neural representations are mathematical, rather than cognitive, and a fictionalist or instrumentalist account, according to which representations are scientifically useful fictions that serve explanatory (and other) aims. After reviewing the free-energy principle and active inference, we argue that the model of adaptive phenotypes under the free-energy principle can be used to furnish a formal semantics, enabling us to assign semantic content to specific phenotypic states (the internal states of a Markovian system that exists far from equilibrium). We propose a modified fictionalist account-an . We argue that, under the free-energy principle, pursuing even a deflationary account of the content of neural representations licenses the appeal to the kind of semantic content involved in the 'aboutness' or intentionality of cognitive systems; our position is thus coherent with, but rests on distinct assumptions from, the realist position. We argue that the free-energy principle thereby explains the aboutness or intentionality in living systems and hence their capacity to parse their sensory stream using an ontology or set of semantic factors.
（1）评估神经表征的构建在变分自由能原理及其推论过程理论——主动推理中是否发挥解释作用；（2）如果是，评估哪种与表征的本体论和认识论地位相关的哲学立场最为合适。我们关注非现实主义（紧缩论和虚构主义-工具主义）方法。我们考虑一种关于心理表征的紧缩论解释，根据这种解释，神经表征中具有解释相关性的内容是数学的，而非认知的；以及一种虚构主义或工具主义解释，根据这种解释，表征是有助于实现解释（及其他）目的的科学上有用的虚构。在回顾了自由能原理和主动推理之后，我们认为自由能原理下的适应性表型模型可用于提供一种形式语义学，使我们能够为特定的表型状态（远离平衡态存在的马尔可夫系统的内部状态）赋予语义内容。我们提出一种修正的虚构主义解释——一种……我们认为，在自由能原理下，即使追求对神经表征内容的紧缩论解释，也允许诉诸认知系统“关于性”或意向性中所涉及的那种语义内容；因此我们的立场与现实主义立场一致，但基于不同的假设。我们认为自由能原理由此解释了生命系统中的关于性或意向性，进而解释了它们利用本体论或一组语义因素解析其感觉流的能力。
