Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science, School of Engineering and Informatics, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9QJ, UK.
Lab of Action & Body, Department of Psychology, Royal Holloway, University of London, Surrey TW20 0EX, UK; The Warburg Institute, School of Advanced Study, University of London, London WC1H 0AB, UK.
Trends Cogn Sci. 2018 Nov;22(11):969-981. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2018.08.008. Epub 2018 Sep 14.
Modern psychology has long focused on the body as the basis of the self. Recently, predictive processing accounts of interoception (perception of the body 'from within') have become influential in accounting for experiences of body ownership and emotion. Here, we describe embodied selfhood in terms of 'instrumental interoceptive inference' that emphasises allostatic regulation and physiological integrity. We apply this approach to the distinctive phenomenology of embodied selfhood, accounting for its non-object-like character and subjective stability over time. Our perspective has implications for the development of selfhood and illuminates longstanding debates about relations between life and mind, implying, contrary to Descartes, that experiences of embodied selfhood arise because of, and not in spite of, our nature as 'beast machines'.
现代心理学长期以来一直将身体作为自我的基础。最近,内感受(对身体“内部”的感知)的预测加工解释在解释身体所有权和情绪体验方面变得很有影响力。在这里,我们根据强调适应调节和生理完整性的“工具性内感受推断”来描述具身自我。我们将这种方法应用于具身自我的独特现象学,解释了它非对象似的特征和随时间的主观稳定性。我们的观点对自我发展具有启示意义,并阐明了关于生命与心灵关系的长期争论,这与笛卡尔的观点相反,即具身自我体验的产生是因为我们是“机器野兽”,而不是不顾我们的本质。