Northwestern University and American Bar Foundation.
Br J Sociol. 2018 Dec;69(4):910-935. doi: 10.1111/1468-4446.12495. Epub 2018 Oct 4.
The SARS epidemic that broke out in late 2002 in China's Guangdong Province highlighted the difficulties of reliance on state-provided information when states have incentives to conceal discrediting information about public health threats. Using SARS and the International Health Regulations (IHR) as a starting point, this article examines negotiated information orders in global public health governance and the irregularities in the supply of data that underlie them. Negotiated information orders within and among the organizations in a field (here, e.g., the World Health Organization, member states, government agencies, and international non-governmental organizations) spell out relationships among different categories of knowledge and non-knowledge - what is known, acknowledged to be known, and available for use in decision making versus what might be known but cannot be acknowledged or officially used. Through information leveraging, technically sufficient information then becomes socially sufficient information. Thus it is especially information initially categorized as non-knowledge - including suppressed data, rumour, unverified evidence, and unofficial information - that creates pressure for the renegotiation of information orders. The argument and evidence of the article also address broader issues about how international law and global norms are realigned, how global norms change, and how social groups manage risk.
2002 年末在中国广东省爆发的严重急性呼吸综合征(SARS)疫情凸显了在国家有动机隐瞒有关公共卫生威胁的不利信息的情况下,依赖国家提供的信息所面临的困难。本文以 SARS 和《国际卫生条例(IHR)》为起点,探讨了在全球公共卫生治理中协商信息秩序以及支撑这些信息秩序的数据供应不规则性问题。在一个领域内(例如,世界卫生组织、成员国、政府机构和国际非政府组织)各组织之间以及组织内部的协商信息秩序规定了不同类别的知识和非知识之间的关系——哪些是已知的、公认的已知的、可用于决策的,哪些可能是已知的但不能承认或正式使用的。通过信息利用,技术上足够的信息随后成为社会上足够的信息。因此,正是最初被归类为非知识的信息——包括被压制的数据、谣言、未经证实的证据和非官方信息——给信息秩序的重新协商带来了压力。本文的论点和论据还涉及更广泛的问题,包括国际法和全球规范如何重新调整、全球规范如何变化以及社会团体如何管理风险。