College of Economics and Management, Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics, Nanjing 211106, China.
Institute of Operations Research, School of Management, Qufu Normal University, Rizhao 276826, China.
Int J Environ Res Public Health. 2018 Apr 4;15(4):678. doi: 10.3390/ijerph15040678.
To reduce carbon emissions during production and realize the recycling of resources, the government has promulgated carbon cap-and-trade regulation and take-back regulation separately. This paper firstly analyses the manufacturing, remanufacturing and collection decisions of a monopoly manufacturer under cap-and-trade regulation and take-back regulation conditions, and then explores the environmental impact (i.e., carbon emissions) of both carbon regulation and more stringent take-back regulation. Finally, numerical examples are provided to illustrate the theoretical results. The results indicate that it will do good for the environment once the cap-and-trade regulation is carried out. We also conclude that government’s supervision of carbon trading price plays an important role in reducing the environmental impact. Furthermore, unexpectedly, we prove that if emissions intensity of a remanufactured (vis-á-vis new) product is sufficiently high, the improvement of collection and remanufacturing targets might lead to the deterioration of environment.
为了降低生产过程中的碳排放并实现资源回收利用，政府分别颁布了碳排放总量控制与交易制度和产品回收制度。本文首先分析了在总量控制与交易制度和产品回收制度下垄断制造商的生产、再制造和回收决策，然后探讨了两种碳管制和更严格的回收管制的环境影响（即碳排放）。最后，通过数值例子说明了理论结果。结果表明，实施总量控制与交易制度将有利于环境。我们还得出结论，政府对碳交易价格的监管在降低环境影响方面起着重要作用。此外，出乎意料的是，我们证明了如果再制造（相对于新产品）产品的排放强度足够高，提高回收和再制造目标可能会导致环境恶化。
