Department of Psychology, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA; Department of Linguistics, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel; Sagol School of Neuroscience, Tel Aviv University, Tel Aviv, Israel.
Department of Psychology, Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA.
Cognition. 2019 Mar;184:96-106. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2018.11.012. Epub 2018 Dec 22.
Presuppositions convey information that comprehenders assume to be true, even when it is tangential to the communicator's main message. For example, a class of verbs called 'factives' (e.g. realize, know) trigger the presupposition that the events or states conveyed by their sentential complements are true. In contrast, non-factive verbs (e.g. think, believe) do not trigger this presupposition. We asked whether, during language comprehension, presuppositions triggered by factive verbs are encoded within the comprehender's discourse model, with neural consequences if violated by later bottom-up inputs. Using event-related potentials (ERPs), we examined neural activity to words that were either consistent or inconsistent with events/states conveyed by the complements of factive versus non-factive verbs while comprehenders read and actively monitored the coherence of short discourse scenarios. We focused on the modulation of a posteriorly-distributed late positivity or P600. This ERP component is produced when comprehenders constrain their discourse model such that it restricts predictions only to event structures that are compatible with this model, and new input violates these event structure predictions. Between 500 and 700 ms, we observed a larger amplitude late posterior positivity/P600 on words that were inconsistent (versus consistent) with the events/states conveyed by the complements of factive verbs. No such effect was observed following non-factive verbs. These findings suggest that, during active discourse comprehension, the presuppositions triggered by factive verbs are encoded and maintained within the comprehender's discourse model. Downstream input that is inconsistent with these presuppositions violates event structure predictions and conflicts with this prior model, producing the late posterior positivity/P600.
预设传达了听话人认为真实的信息,即使这些信息与说话人的主要信息无关。例如,一类被称为“事实动词”(如 realize、know)的动词触发了这样一个预设,即它们的句子补语所传达的事件或状态是真实的。相比之下,非事实动词(如 think、believe)则不会触发这个预设。我们想知道,在语言理解过程中,事实动词触发的预设是否被听话人的语篇模型所编码,如果后来的自下而上的输入违反了这些预设,是否会产生神经后果。我们使用事件相关电位(ERP)来研究听话人在阅读和积极监测短语篇情景连贯性时,对事实动词和非事实动词补语所传达的事件/状态的一致或不一致的词的神经活动。我们关注的是一个分布在后脑的晚期正性或 P600 的调制。当听话人限制他们的语篇模型,使它只将预测限制在与这个模型兼容的事件结构上,而新的输入违反了这些事件结构预测时,就会产生这种 ERP 成分。在 500 到 700 毫秒之间,我们观察到在与事实动词补语所传达的事件/状态不一致(相比一致)的词上,有更大的后晚期正性/P600 振幅。在非事实动词之后,没有观察到这种效应。这些发现表明,在积极的语篇理解过程中,事实动词触发的预设被听话人的语篇模型所编码和保持。与这些预设不一致的后续输入违反了事件结构预测,并与之前的模型产生冲突,从而产生了晚期后正性/P600。