Maehira Yuki, Spencer Robert C
Department of Emerging Infectious Diseases, Nagasaki University Institute of Tropical Medicine, Nagasaki, Japan.
Index Microbiology Ltd., School of Veterinary Science, University of Bristol, Bristol, United Kingdom.
Front Public Health. 2019 Sep 12;7:249. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2019.00249. eCollection 2019.
Following the global-level Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak during 2014-2016, international collaboration with multiorganizational participation has rapidly increased. Given the greater priorities for research and development (R&D) outcomes despite the quantitative and qualitative lack of high-containment laboratory facilities in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs), where biological targets for investigation are located near their natural habitats, occupational readiness for health workers' safety has not been well-addressed, where limited global expert human resources are being deployed to high-containment laboratories including biosafety level 4 (BSL-4) facilities for case management and medical investigations. Pursuing scientific and managerial success to make laboratories efficient and productive, most laboratory safety policies have focused on the functionality of technical skills or performance, procedural methodologies, and supervision over the employees to collaborate in LMICs. The experts dispatched from advanced countries bring a long list of scientific tasks with high-tech devices, supplies, and training programs to introduce their collaboration with local partners in LMICs. However, the dispatched experts would subsequently realize their list becomes endless to establish their basic functions required in high-containment laboratories to ensure qualified scientific outcomes in LMICs. Under such circumstances where dual or multiple policies and standards accommodated pose dilemmas for operational procedures to ensure biosafety and biosecurity, all the frontline experts from both LMICs and advanced countries may be exposed to significant risks of life-threating infection of highly pathogenic agents like EVD, without any pragmatic measures or road maps to establish valued international collaboration, pursuing its sustainability. Given the fact mentioned above, we conducted a quick review of the key biosafety and biosecurity management documents, relevant policy analyses, and research to understand the current status and, if any, measures to dissolve critical dilemmas mentioned above. As a result, we found that occupational safety and health (OSH) aspects had not been sufficiently addressed, particularly in the context of international BSL-4 collaboration in LMICs. Moreover, consideration of OSH can be one of the key drivers to make such collaborative interventions more pragmatic, safer to reorient, harness disease-based vertical approaches, and harmonize policies of biosafety and biosecurity, particularly for collaborations organized in resource-limited settings.
在2014 - 2016年全球范围内爆发埃博拉病毒病(EVD)之后,多方组织参与的国际合作迅速增加。鉴于中低收入国家(LMICs)在研发成果方面有更高的优先级,尽管这些国家在高防护实验室设施的数量和质量上存在不足,而生物研究目标又位于其自然栖息地附近,但卫生工作者安全的职业准备工作并未得到妥善解决,全球有限的专家人力资源被部署到包括生物安全4级(BSL - 4)设施在内的高防护实验室进行病例管理和医学调查。为了在科学和管理上取得成功,使实验室高效且富有成效,大多数实验室安全政策都侧重于技术技能或性能的功能、程序方法以及对中低收入国家员工协作的监督。从发达国家派遣的专家带来了一长串科学任务,包括高科技设备、物资和培训项目,以介绍他们与中低收入国家当地合作伙伴的合作。然而,这些被派遣的专家随后会意识到,为了在中低收入国家建立高防护实验室所需的基本功能以确保合格的科学成果,他们的任务清单变得无穷无尽。在这种双重或多重政策和标准给确保生物安全和生物安保的操作程序带来困境的情况下,来自中低收入国家和发达国家的所有一线专家都可能面临感染埃博拉病毒病等高致病性病原体的重大生命威胁风险,却没有任何务实的措施或路线图来建立有价值的国际合作并实现其可持续性。鉴于上述事实,我们对关键的生物安全和生物安保管理文件、相关政策分析及研究进行了快速审查,以了解当前状况以及是否有措施解决上述关键困境。结果发现,职业安全与健康(OSH)方面尚未得到充分解决,特别是在中低收入国家国际BSL - 4合作的背景下。此外,考虑职业安全与健康可以成为使此类合作干预更加务实、重新定位更安全、利用基于疾病的垂直方法以及协调生物安全和生物安保政策的关键驱动因素之一,特别是对于在资源有限环境中组织的合作。