Institut für Soziologie, Universität Leipzig, Beethovenstr. 15, 04107, Leipzig, Germany.
Hum Nat. 2019 Dec;30(4):398-421. doi: 10.1007/s12110-019-09353-5.
Fairness is undoubtedly an essential normative concept in humans and promotes cooperation in human societies. The fact that fairness exists is puzzling, however, because it works against the short-term interest of individuals. Theories of genetic evolution, cultural evolution, and gene-culture coevolution identify plausible mechanisms for the evolution of fairness in humans. Such mechanisms include kin selection, the support of group-beneficial moral norms through ethnic markers, free partner choice with equal outside options, and free partner choice with reputation as well as spite in small populations. Here, we present the results of a common-pool resource game experiment on sharing. Based on data from 37 multiethnic villages in a subsistence agricultural population in Foutah Djallon, Guinea, we show that fair behavior in our experiment increased with increasing ethnic homogeneity and market integration. Group size and kinship had the opposite effect. Overall, fair behavior was not conditional on reputation. Instead, the ability of the different village populations to support individuals' fairness in situations lacking the opportunity to build a positive reputation varied significantly. Our results suggest that evolutionary theory provides a useful framework for the analysis of fairness in humans.
公平无疑是人类的一个基本规范概念,它促进了人类社会的合作。然而,公平的存在是令人困惑的,因为它违背了个人的短期利益。遗传进化、文化进化和基因-文化共同进化理论确定了人类公平进化的合理机制。这些机制包括亲属选择、通过族群标记支持对群体有益的道德规范、具有平等外部选择的自由伴侣选择,以及在小群体中具有声誉和恶意的自由伴侣选择。在这里,我们展示了一个关于共享的共同资源博弈实验的结果。基于来自几内亚富塔贾隆的一个自给农业人口的 37 个多族群村庄的数据,我们表明,我们实验中的公平行为随着族群同质性和市场一体化程度的增加而增加。群体规模和亲属关系则有相反的效果。总体而言,公平行为不受声誉的影响。相反,不同村庄群体在缺乏建立积极声誉机会的情况下支持个人公平的能力存在显著差异。我们的结果表明,进化理论为分析人类的公平提供了一个有用的框架。