Birkbeck, University of London, Bloomsbury, London, United Kingdom.
J Med Philos. 2020 May 21;45(3):297-311. doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhaa006.
According to one influential view, requirements to elicit consent for medical interventions and other interactions gain their rationale from the respect we owe to each other as autonomous, or self-governing, rational agents. Yet, the popular presumption that consent has a central role to play in legitimate intervention extends beyond the domain of cases where autonomous agency is present to cases where far from fully autonomous agents make choices that, as likely as not, are going to be against their own best interest. The question of how we should understand the rationale for eliciting consent in this range of "nonideal" cases is comparatively ill understood. In this paper, I explore the prospects of accounting for consent requirements in such "nonideal" cases by appealing to a set of agency-based interests, including an interest in playing a meaningful part in joint decisions affecting ourselves and others.
根据一种有影响力的观点，为医疗干预和其他互动征求同意的要求，其合理性来自于我们彼此作为自主的或自我管理的理性主体所应有的尊重。然而，同意在合法干预中扮演核心角色的普遍假设，不仅限于自主代理存在的情况，还延伸到远非完全自主的代理做出选择的情况，这些选择很可能违背他们自己的最佳利益。在这一系列“非理想”情况下，我们应该如何理解征求同意的理由，这一问题相对而言尚未得到充分理解。在本文中，我通过诉诸一套基于代理的利益，包括在影响我们自己和他人的共同决策中发挥有意义作用的利益，来探讨在这种“非理想”情况下解释同意要求的可能性。
