Ariful Kabir K M, Tanimoto Jun
Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan; Department of Mathematics, Bangladesh University of Engineering and Technology, Dhaka, Bangladesh.
Faculty of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan; Interdisciplinary Graduate School of Engineering Sciences, Kyushu University, Kasuga-koen, Kasuga-shi, Fukuoka 816-8580, Japan.
J Theor Biol. 2020 Oct 21;503:110399. doi: 10.1016/j.jtbi.2020.110399. Epub 2020 Jul 8.
In the context of voluntary vaccination, we consider two additional provisions as well as pre-emptive vaccination for a unified model over epidemiology and evolutionary game theory to assess the extent to which advanced and late provisions restrict the spread of disease. To circumvent infection, people can be vaccinated pre-emptively before the epidemic season, but the imperfectness of vaccination or an unwillingness to be vaccinated may cause people instead to either be late-vaccinated or use self-protection. Here, self-protection corresponds to actions such as wearing a mask, washing hands, or using a mosquito net and is defined as the third strategy after pre-emptive vaccination (the first strategy) and late-vaccination (the second strategy). Our model can reproduce multiple social dilemma situations resulting from what is known as the vaccination dilemma (originating from preemptive vaccination), which works on a global time scale (i.e., repeated seasons approaching social equilibrium), and also from two other dilemmas due to late provisions, which work on a local time scale (i.e., every time step in a single season). To reproduce how an individual can acquire information for adaptation from neighbors or the society for a suitable provision, we introduce several strategy-updating rules for both global and local time scales and this behavioral feedback has a significant effect to reducing a transmissible disease. We also establish the social efficiency deficit (SED) indicator for a triple-dilemma game to quantify the existence of a social dilemma. Relying fully on a theoretical framework, our model provides a new perspective for evaluations: (i) how much more advantageous and effective pre-emptive vaccination is in eradicating a communicable disease compared with late provisions such as late vaccination and self-protection, and (ii) the extent of the social dilemma resulting from each of the three provisions, given the new idea of SED. The main effect of the triple-dilemma is that expensive provision displays no SED (no dilemma) until the efficiency or effectiveness of provisions reaches a certain level.
在自愿接种疫苗的背景下，我们考虑了另外两项规定以及抢先接种疫苗的情况，以建立一个基于流行病学和进化博弈论的统一模型，来评估提前和滞后规定对疾病传播的限制程度。为了避免感染，人们可以在流行季节之前抢先接种疫苗，但疫苗接种的不完善或不愿接种疫苗可能会导致人们要么延迟接种，要么采取自我保护措施。在这里，自我保护对应于诸如戴口罩、洗手或使用蚊帐等行为，并被定义为继抢先接种疫苗（第一种策略）和延迟接种疫苗（第二种策略）之后的第三种策略。我们的模型可以重现由所谓的疫苗接种困境（源于抢先接种疫苗）导致的多种社会困境情况，这种困境在全球时间尺度上起作用（即接近社会均衡的重复季节），也可以重现由于滞后规定导致的另外两种困境，这两种困境在局部时间尺度上起作用（即单个季节中的每个时间步长）。为了重现个体如何从邻居或社会获取信息以适应合适的规定，我们引入了几种适用于全球和局部时间尺度的策略更新规则，并且这种行为反馈对减少传染病有显著效果。我们还为三困境博弈建立了社会效率赤字（SED）指标，以量化社会困境的存在。完全基于理论框架，我们的模型为评估提供了一个新视角：（i）与诸如延迟接种疫苗和自我保护等滞后规定相比，抢先接种疫苗在根除传染病方面有多有利和有效，以及（ii）鉴于SED的新观点，三种规定各自导致的社会困境程度。三困境的主要影响是，在规定的效率或效果达到一定水平之前，昂贵的规定不会显示出SED（没有困境）。
