Constant Axel, Clark Andy, Friston Karl J
Charles Perkins Centre, The University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW, Australia.
Department of Philosophy, The University of Sussex, Brighton, United Kingdom.
Front Psychol. 2021 Jan 7;11:598733. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2020.598733. eCollection 2020.
Over the last 30 years, representationalist and dynamicist positions in the philosophy of cognitive science have argued over whether neurocognitive processes should be viewed as representational or not. Major scientific and technological developments over the years have furnished both parties with ever more sophisticated conceptual weaponry. In recent years, an enactive generalization of predictive processing - known as active inference - has been proposed as a unifying theory of brain functions. Since then, active inference has fueled both representationalist and dynamicist campaigns. However, we believe that when diving into the formal details of active inference, one should be able to find a solution to the war; if not a peace treaty, surely an armistice of a sort. Based on an analysis of these formal details, this paper shows how both representationalist and dynamicist sensibilities can peacefully coexist within the new territory of active inference.
在过去30年里，认知科学哲学中的表征主义和动力主义立场一直在争论神经认知过程是否应被视为具有表征性。多年来重大的科技发展为双方提供了越来越复杂的概念武器。近年来，一种对预测处理的生成性概括——即主动推理——被提出作为大脑功能的统一理论。从那时起，主动推理为表征主义和动力主义阵营都注入了活力。然而，我们认为，在深入研究主动推理的形式细节时，应该能够找到这场争论的解决方案；如果不是和平条约，肯定也是某种形式的休战。基于对这些形式细节的分析，本文展示了表征主义和动力主义的观点如何能在主动推理的新领域中和平共处。
