LNT and cancer risk assessment: Its flawed foundations part 1: Radiation and leukemia: Where LNT began.

This paper evaluates the scientific basis for the adoption of the linear non-threshold (LNT) dose response model for radiation-induced leukemia. This LNT risk assessment application for leukemia is significant because it: (1) was generalized for all tumor types induced by ionizing radiation and chemical carcinogens at relatively high doses and; (2) it was based on the mechanistic assumption of low dose linearity for somatic cell mutations as determined from responses in mature spermatozoa of fruit flies. A serious problem with the latter assumption is that those spermatozoa lack DNA repair. The acceptance of the LNT dose response model for cancer risk assessment was based on the convergence of recommendations of the BEAR I Genetics Panel (1956a) for reproductive cell gene mutations and those of Lewis (1957a) for somatic cell mutation and its capacity to explain apparent and/or predicted linear dose responses of ionizing radiation-induced leukemia in multiple and diverse epidemiological investigations. Use of that model and related dose response beliefs achieved rapid, widespread and enduring acceptance in the scientific and regulatory communities. They provide the key historical foundation for the sustained LNT-based policy for cancer risk assessment to the present. While previous papers in this series have challenged key scientific assessments and ethical foundations of the BEAR I Genetics Panel, the present paper provides evidence that Lewis: 1) incorrectly interpreted the fundamental scientific studies used to support the LNT conclusion even though such studies show consistent hormetic-J-shaped dose response relationships for leukemia in Hiroshima and Nagasaki survivors; and, 2) demonstrated widespread bias in support of an LNT conclusion and related policies, which kept him from making an objective and fair assessment. The LNT recommendation appears to have been uncritically accepted and integrated into scientific and regulatory practice in large part because it inappropriately appealed to existing authority and it garnered the support of those who were willing to risk greatly exaggerating the public's fears of environmentally-induced disease, such as enhanced risk of leukemia, with the goal of stopping the atmospheric testing of atomic bombs. Adoption of the LNT recommendation demonstrated extensive penetration of ideological influence affecting governmental, scientific and regulatory evaluation at the highest levels in the United States. This paper demonstrates that the scientific foundations for cancer risk assessment were inappropriately and inaccurately assessed, unethically adopted and require significant historical, scientific and regulatory remediation.