Koppl Roger
Syracuse University, Syracuse, USA.
Public Choice. 2023;195(1-2):101-124. doi: 10.1007/s11127-021-00928-4. Epub 2021 Sep 17.
In a modern democracy, a public health system includes mechanisms for the provision of expert scientific advice to elected officials. The decisions of elected officials generally will be degraded by expert failure, that is, the provision of bad advice. The theory of expert failure suggests that competition among experts generally is the best safeguard against expert failure. Monopoly power of experts increases the chance of expert failure. The risk of expert failure also is greater when scientific advice is provided by only one or a few disciplines. A national government can simulate a competitive market for expert advice by structuring the scientific advice it receives to ensure the production of multiple perspectives from multiple disciplines. I apply these general principles to the United Kingdom's Scientific Advisory Group for Emergencies (SAGE).
在现代民主国家，公共卫生系统包括为当选官员提供专业科学建议的机制。当选官员的决策通常会因专家失误（即提供错误建议）而受到影响。专家失误理论表明，专家之间的竞争通常是防止专家失误的最佳保障。专家的垄断权力会增加专家失误的可能性。当仅由一个或几个学科提供科学建议时，专家失误的风险也更大。国家政府可以通过构建其收到的科学建议，模拟一个专家建议的竞争市场，以确保从多个学科产生多种观点。我将这些一般原则应用于英国紧急情况科学咨询小组（SAGE）。
