Wang Ruotong, Li Jianbin, Xu Han, Dai Bin
School of Management, Huazhong University of Science & Technology, Wuhan, 430074 China.
School of Economics and Management, Wuhan University, Wuhan, 430072 China.
J Syst Sci Syst Eng. 2022;31(4):414-436. doi: 10.1007/s11518-022-5532-x. Epub 2022 Jun 18.
Sales promotion is getting more and more prosperous in Chinese cross-border e-commerce platforms where the demand is uncertain. However, most existing literature on promotion strategies is focusing on deterministic demand. In this paper, we propose a game-theoretical model under multiplicative stochastic demand to investigate the pricing, inventory quantity and sales promotion strategies for a supply chain which is consisted of one cross-border distributor and one capital-constrained retailer under a consignment contract. We obtain the equilibrium outcomes under stochastic demand, and find that the optimal price and promotion investment depend on demand uncertainty under endogenous inventory decisions. With exogenous unlimited inventory, the retailer prefers owing promotion right when the elasticity of price and promotion is small enough and its capital is sufficient, while the distributor always prefers to control sales promotion. With endogenous inventory quantity, the sensitivity of demand to price is influence by the demand uncertainty. The retailer prefers to decide the promotion when the price-elasticity is small, while the distributor prefers to decide the promotion under large promotion-elasticity. And the intensity of optimal sales promotion made by retailers may be stronger than that when the distributor owns the promotion right, which depends on the elasticity of price and promotion. More importantly, it is always better for consumers when the distributor reserves the promotion right as a lower optimal retailing price is offered.
在中国需求不确定的跨境电商平台上，促销活动越来越繁荣。然而，大多数现有的促销策略文献都聚焦于确定性需求。在本文中，我们提出了一个在乘法随机需求下的博弈论模型，以研究由一个跨境经销商和一个在寄售合同下资金受限的零售商组成的供应链的定价、库存数量和促销策略。我们得出了随机需求下的均衡结果，并发现在内生库存决策下，最优价格和促销投资取决于需求不确定性。在外生无限库存的情况下，当价格和促销的弹性足够小且零售商资金充足时，零售商更倾向于拥有促销权，而经销商总是更倾向于控制促销活动。在内生库存数量的情况下，需求对价格的敏感度受需求不确定性的影响。当价格弹性较小时，零售商更倾向于决定促销活动，而当促销弹性较大时，经销商更倾向于决定促销活动。并且零售商进行的最优促销强度可能比经销商拥有促销权时更强，这取决于价格和促销的弹性。更重要的是，当经销商保留促销权时，消费者总是受益的，因为此时会提供更低的最优零售价格。
