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决策时间对惩罚行为及其评估的潜在影响。

Potential influence of decision time on punishment behavior and its evaluation.

作者信息

Maeda Kaede, Kumai Yuka, Hashimoto Hirofumi

机构信息

Department of Psychology, College of Contemporary Psychology, Rikkyo University, Niiza, Japan.

Graduate School of Letters, Yasuda Women's University, Hiroshima, Japan.

出版信息

Front Psychol. 2022 Aug 22;13:794953. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2022.794953. eCollection 2022.

Abstract

Previous studies on whether punishers are rewarded by reputational gains have yielded conflicting results. Some studies have argued that punitive behaviors potentially result in a positive evaluation, while others have found the opposite. This study aims to clarify the conditions that lead to the positive evaluation of costly punishment. Study 1 utilized one-round and repeated public goods game (PGG) situations and manipulated decision time for participants' punitive behavior toward the non-cooperative person in the situation. We also asked participants to report their impression evaluations of punitive behavior toward non-cooperative people. Moreover, utilizing the second- and third-party punishment games, Study 2 manipulated the decision time of participants' punitive behavior toward the self-interested person and asked them to evaluate the punitive behavior. The results showed that those who punished intuitively were not likely to be evaluated positively. However, punishers were rewarded when the decision to punish was made after deliberation or made by those who were not direct victims. These findings extend previous research on the evaluation of punitive behavior and reveal that deliberative punishment is evaluated positively occasionally.

摘要

以往关于惩罚者是否会因声誉提升而获得回报的研究结果相互矛盾。一些研究认为,惩罚行为可能会带来积极评价,而另一些研究则得出了相反的结论。本研究旨在阐明导致对代价高昂的惩罚给予积极评价的条件。研究1利用一轮和重复公共品博弈(PGG)情境,对参与者在该情境中对不合作人员的惩罚行为的决策时间进行了操纵。我们还要求参与者报告他们对针对不合作人员的惩罚行为的印象评价。此外,研究2利用第二方和第三方惩罚博弈,操纵了参与者对利己主义者的惩罚行为的决策时间,并要求他们对惩罚行为进行评价。结果表明,那些凭直觉进行惩罚的人不太可能得到积极评价。然而,当惩罚决定是经过深思熟虑做出的,或者是由非直接受害者做出时,惩罚者会得到回报。这些发现扩展了以往关于惩罚行为评价的研究,并揭示了深思熟虑的惩罚偶尔会得到积极评价。

https://cdn.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/blobs/1fce/9441668/dc8b41af3274/fpsyg-13-794953-g001.jpg

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