Network Science Institute, Northeastern University, Boston, USA; Institute of Quantitative Social Science, Harvard University, Cambridge, USA.
Network Science Institute, Northeastern University, Boston, USA.
Cognition. 2023 Jan;230:105276. doi: 10.1016/j.cognition.2022.105276. Epub 2022 Sep 26.
After misinformation has been corrected, people initially update their belief extremely well. However, this change is rarely sustained over time, with belief returning towards pre-correction levels. This is called belief regression. The current study aimed to examine the association between memory for the correction and belief regression, and whether corrected misinformation suffers from belief regression more than affirmed facts. Participants from Prolific Academic (N = 612) rated the veracity of 16 misinformation and 16 factual items and were randomly assigned to a correction condition or test-retest control. Immediately after misinformation was corrected and facts affirmed, participants re-rated their belief and were asked whether they could remember the items' presented veracity. Participants repeated this post-test one month later. We found that belief and memory were highly associated, both immediately (⍴ = 0.51), and after one month (⍴ = 0.82), and that memory explained 66% of the variance in belief regression after correcting for measurement reliability. We found the rate of dissenting (accurately remembering that misinformation was presented as false but still believing it) remained stable between the immediate and delayed post-test, while the rate of forgetting quadrupled. After one month, 57% of participants who believed in the misinformation thought that the items were presented to them as true. Belief regression was more pronounced for misinformation than facts, but this was greatly attenuated once pre-test belief was equated. Together, these results clearly indicate that memory plays a fundamental role in belief regression, and that repeated corrections could be an effective method to counteract this phenomenon.
在错误信息得到纠正后,人们最初会非常好地更新他们的信念。然而,这种变化很少能持续很长时间,信念会回到纠正前的水平。这被称为信念回归。本研究旨在检验记忆与信念回归之间的关系,以及纠正后的错误信息是否比肯定的事实更容易受到信念回归的影响。来自 Prolific Academic 的参与者(N=612)对 16 条错误信息和 16 条事实信息的真实性进行了评级,并被随机分配到纠正条件或测试-再测试控制组。在错误信息被纠正和事实被肯定后,参与者立即重新评估他们的信念,并被要求是否能记住这些项目的呈现真实性。一个月后,参与者重复了这个后测。我们发现,信念和记忆高度相关,无论是在立即(⍴=0.51)还是一个月后(⍴=0.82),并且在纠正了测量可靠性后,记忆解释了纠正后信念回归的 66%的方差。我们发现,在即时和延迟后测之间,持不同意见的比例(准确地记住错误信息是被呈现为错误的,但仍然相信它)保持稳定,而遗忘的比例则增加了四倍。一个月后,57%的相信错误信息的参与者认为这些项目是被呈现给他们为真的。与事实相比,错误信息的信念回归更为明显,但在将前测信念相等化后,这种情况大大减弱。总的来说,这些结果清楚地表明,记忆在信念回归中起着至关重要的作用,重复纠正可能是对抗这种现象的有效方法。