Department of Psychology, University of Amsterdam, Nieuwe Achtergracht 129B, 1001, NK, Amsterdam, Netherlands.
Department of Psychology, Universität der Bundeswehr München, Munich, Germany.
Psychon Bull Rev. 2024 Feb;31(1):242-248. doi: 10.3758/s13423-023-02299-x. Epub 2023 Aug 1.
Huisman (Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 1-10. 2022) argued that a valid measure of evidence should indicate more support in favor of a true alternative hypothesis when sample size is large than when it is small. Bayes factors may violate this pattern and hence Huisman concluded that Bayes factors are invalid as a measure of evidence. In this brief comment we call attention to the following: (1) Huisman's purported anomaly is in fact dictated by probability theory; (2) Huisman's anomaly has been discussed and explained in the statistical literature since 1939; the anomaly was also highlighted in the Psychonomic Bulletin & Review article by Rouder et al. (2009), who interpreted the anomaly as "ideal": an interpretation diametrically opposed to that of Huisman. We conclude that when intuition clashes with probability theory, chances are that it is intuition that needs schooling.
胡斯曼(Psychonomic Bulletin & Review,2022)认为,当样本量较大时,有效的证据衡量标准应该比样本量较小时更支持真实的替代假设。贝叶斯因子可能违反这种模式,因此胡斯曼得出结论,贝叶斯因子作为证据衡量标准是无效的。在这个简短的评论中,我们提请注意以下几点:(1)胡斯曼所谓的异常实际上是由概率论决定的;(2)自 1939 年以来,统计文献中一直在讨论和解释胡斯曼的异常;这种异常也在 Rouder 等人(2009)的《心理学期刊与评论》一文中得到了强调,他们将这种异常解释为“理想”:这一解释与胡斯曼的解释截然相反。我们的结论是,当直觉与概率论发生冲突时,很可能是需要接受概率论的教育。