Wagenmakers Eric-Jan, Ly Alexander
University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Centrum Wiskunde and Informatica, University of Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands.
Arch Hist Exact Sci. 2023;77(1):25-72. doi: 10.1007/s00407-022-00298-3. Epub 2022 Aug 26.
The Jeffreys-Lindley paradox exposes a rift between Bayesian and frequentist hypothesis testing that strikes at the heart of statistical inference. Contrary to what most current literature suggests, the paradox was central to the Bayesian testing methodology developed by Sir Harold Jeffreys in the late 1930s. Jeffreys showed that the evidence for a point-null hypothesis scales with and repeatedly argued that it would, therefore, be mistaken to set a threshold for rejecting at a constant multiple of the standard error. Here, we summarize Jeffreys's early work on the paradox and clarify his reasons for including the term. The prior distribution is seen to play a crucial role; by implicitly correcting for selection, small parameter values are identified as relatively surprising under . We highlight the general nature of the paradox by presenting both a fully frequentist and a fully Bayesian version. We also demonstrate that the paradox does not depend on assigning prior mass to a point hypothesis, as is commonly believed.
杰弗里斯 - 林德利悖论揭示了贝叶斯学派和频率学派假设检验之间的分歧,这一分歧直击统计推断的核心。与当前大多数文献所暗示的情况相反,该悖论在20世纪30年代末哈罗德·杰弗里斯爵士所发展的贝叶斯检验方法中处于核心地位。杰弗里斯表明,针对点零假设的证据与 成比例,并反复论证,因此,将拒绝 的阈值设定为标准误差的恒定倍数是错误的。在此,我们总结杰弗里斯早期关于该悖论的工作,并阐明他纳入 项的原因。先验分布被视为起着关键作用;通过隐含地校正选择,小参数值在 下被视为相对令人惊讶。我们通过呈现一个完全频率学派版本和一个完全贝叶斯版本来突出该悖论的一般性。我们还证明,该悖论并不像通常所认为的那样依赖于给点假设赋予先验质量。