Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, Macao Polytechnic University, Macao, Macao SAR, China.
Front Public Health. 2024 Mar 1;12:1338122. doi: 10.3389/fpubh.2024.1338122. eCollection 2024.
China's one-child policy was in effect from 1982 to 2015. However, the literature examining the association between people's trust in local government and intergenerational transmission of fertility intentions is scarce. To fill this gap, we investigated the impact of individuals' sibship size on their ideal number of children, the mediating effect of their trust in local government on the issue of fertility between two successive generations, and the moderating effect of education level on sibship size related to trust in local governments. Based on the 2019 Chinese Social Survey data, 2,340 respondents aged 18-35 participated in the analysis. The results showed that (i) individuals' number of siblings significantly positively predicted their ideal number of children; (ii) individuals' number of siblings significantly negatively predicted their trust in the local government, which in turn significantly negatively influenced fertility intentions; (iii) the mediating mechanism was significant in residents with higher levels of education, but not in people with lower degrees of education. Fertility-boosting incentives can prioritize couples who are the only child in their family. It is necessary for local governments to improve their credibility and strengthen their pregnancy-related communication with groups with higher levels of education.
中国的独生子女政策于 1982 年至 2015 年实施。然而，关于人们对地方政府的信任与生育意愿代际传递之间关系的文献却很少。为了填补这一空白，我们调查了个体的兄弟姐妹数量对其理想子女数量的影响、他们对地方政府的信任在两代人之间的生育问题上的中介作用，以及教育水平对与地方政府信任相关的兄弟姐妹数量的调节作用。基于 2019 年中国社会调查数据，共有 2340 名 18-35 岁的受访者参与了分析。结果表明：（i）个体的兄弟姐妹数量显著正向预测其理想子女数量；（ii）个体的兄弟姐妹数量显著负向预测其对地方政府的信任，进而显著负向影响生育意愿；（iii）这种中介机制在教育程度较高的居民中显著，但在教育程度较低的居民中不显著。促进生育的激励措施可以优先考虑家中唯一的孩子的夫妇。地方政府有必要提高其可信度，并加强与教育程度较高的群体在怀孕相关的沟通。
