Hawkins Benjamin
MRC Epidemiology Unit, Institute of Metabolic Science, Cambridge Biomedical Campus, Cambridge, UK.
Int J Health Policy Manag. 2024;13:8341. doi: 10.34172/ijhpm.8341. Epub 2024 Aug 28.
A now extensive literature has documented political strategies of health-harming industries (HHIs), but little is known about their engagement with parliamentary select committees. Recent investments by trans-national tobacco corporations (TTCs) in electronic nicotine delivery systems (ENDS) has raised concerns that industry actors may be using these to re-engage policy-makers in ways precluded by the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) Article 5.3.
This article examines tobacco industry engagement with the United Kingdom House of Commons Science and Technology Committee (STC) inquiry into e-cigarettes. It draws on a qualitative analysis of semi-structured interviews with committee members and support staff (n=4) triangulated against written and oral evidence submissions.
TTCs featured prominently in the STC inquiry via written and oral submissions. Opportunities existed for industry engagement, and potential influence, at each stage of the process. There was an absence of oral testimony from those sceptical about the potential health benefits of ENDS. The governance mechanisms in place for select committees appear inadequate for protecting committee work from industry influence. As it relates to TTCs, this has implications for the UK's commitments under FCTC Article 5.3, yet understanding of the FCTC and the requirements of Article 5.3 compliance within the committee were limited.
The governance of select committees requires urgent reform in order to balance norms of openness and participation with the need to protect their work from power of economic actors with conflicts of interest (COI). This is particularly the case in relation to TTCs and adherence to FCTC Article 5.3. These findings are of relevance to other select committees whose work affects the interests of HHIs. Further research is needed on other committees and sectors.
目前已有大量文献记录了有害健康产业(HHIs)的政治策略,但对于它们与议会特别委员会的互动却知之甚少。跨国烟草公司(TTCs)近期对电子尼古丁传送系统(ENDS)的投资引发了人们的担忧,即行业行为者可能正利用这些系统以《烟草控制框架公约》(FCTC)第5.3条所禁止的方式重新接触政策制定者。
本文考察了烟草行业与英国下议院科学技术委员会(STC)对电子烟调查的互动情况。它基于对委员会成员和辅助人员(n = 4)的半结构化访谈进行定性分析,并与书面和口头证据提交材料相互印证。
跨国烟草公司通过书面和口头陈述在科学技术委员会的调查中占据显著地位。在这一过程的每个阶段都存在行业参与和潜在影响的机会。对电子尼古丁传送系统潜在健康益处持怀疑态度的人没有提供口头证词。特别委员会现有的治理机制似乎不足以保护委员会工作免受行业影响。就跨国烟草公司而言,这对英国在《烟草控制框架公约》第5.3条下的承诺产生了影响,然而委员会内部对《烟草控制框架公约》以及第5.3条合规要求的理解有限。
特别委员会的治理需要紧急改革,以平衡开放性和参与性规范与保护其工作免受存在利益冲突(COI)的经济行为者权力影响的需求。在跨国烟草公司以及遵守《烟草控制框架公约》第5.3条方面尤其如此。这些发现与其他工作影响有害健康产业利益的特别委员会相关。需要对其他委员会和部门进行进一步研究。