Jurjako Marko
Department of Philosophy and Division of Cognitive Sciences, Faculty of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of Rijeka, Sveucilisna avenija 4, 51000, Rijeka, Croatia.
Discov Ment Health. 2024 Dec 2;4(1):62. doi: 10.1007/s44192-024-00117-x.
Despite many authors in psychiatry endorsing a naturalist view of the mind, many still consider that mental dysfunctions cannot be reduced to brain dysfunctions. This paper investigates the main reasons for this view. Some arguments rely on the analogy that the mind is like software while the brain is like hardware. The analogy suggests that just as software can malfunction independently of hardware malfunctions, similarly the mind can malfunction independently of any brain malfunction. This view has been critically examined in recent literature. However, other less discussed reasons suggest that mental dysfunctions cannot be reduced to brain dysfunctions because mental dysfunctions are appropriately ascribed at the level of intentional mental states, while brain dysfunctions are solely related to abnormalities in anatomy and physiological processes. This paper questions why such a view would be upheld. The discussion is framed within the interface problem in the philosophy of cognitive science, which concerns the relationship between personal and subpersonal levels of explanation. The paper examines the view that an autonomist perspective on the personal/subpersonal distinction could justify the separation of mental dysfunctions, described in intentional terms, from brain dysfunctions, described in anatomical or physiological terms. Ultimately, the paper argues that the autonomist view cannot be upheld in psychiatry and, consequently, does not provide a principled justification for rejecting the reduction of mental dysfunctions to brain dysfunctions.
尽管精神病学领域的许多作者都赞同对心智的自然主义观点，但仍有许多人认为精神功能障碍不能简化为大脑功能障碍。本文探讨了这一观点的主要原因。一些论点基于这样的类比：心智就像软件，而大脑就像硬件。这种类比表明，正如软件可以独立于硬件故障而出现故障一样，心智也可以独立于任何大脑故障而出现故障。最近的文献对这一观点进行了批判性审视。然而，其他较少讨论的原因表明，精神功能障碍不能简化为大脑功能障碍，因为精神功能障碍适当地归因于意向性心理状态层面，而大脑功能障碍仅与解剖结构和生理过程的异常有关。本文质疑为何会坚持这样一种观点。讨论围绕认知科学哲学中的界面问题展开，该问题涉及个人层面和亚个人层面解释之间的关系。本文考察了这样一种观点，即对个人/亚个人区分的自主主义观点可以为将用意向性术语描述的精神功能障碍与用解剖学或生理学术语描述的大脑功能障碍区分开来提供正当理由。最终，本文认为自主主义观点在精神病学中无法成立，因此，它不能为拒绝将精神功能障碍简化为大脑功能障碍提供有原则的正当理由。
