French Nigel P, Maxwell Howard, Baker Michael G, Callaghan Fiona, Dyet Kristin, Geoghegan Jemma L, Hayman David T S, Huang Q Sue, Kvalsvig Amanda, Russell Euan, Scott Pippa, Thompson Te Pora, Plank Michael J
Tāwharau Ora, Massey University, Tennant Drive, Palmerston North 4442, New Zealand.
Division of Health Sciences, University of Otago, Dunedin 9016, New Zealand.
Lancet Reg Health West Pac. 2025 Mar 18;56:101525. doi: 10.1016/j.lanwpc.2025.101525. eCollection 2025 Mar.
In 2020 Aotearoa New Zealand, like many other countries, faced the coronavirus pandemic armed with an influenza-based pandemic plan. The country adapted rapidly to mount a highly strategic and effective elimination response to the SARS-CoV-2 pandemic. However, implementation was hampered by gaps in pandemic preparedness. These gaps undermined effectiveness of the response and exacerbated inequitable impacts of both Covid-19 disease and control measures. Our review examines the Covid-19 response, reflecting on strengths, limitations and implications for pandemic planning. We identify three key areas for improvement: 1) development of a systematised procedure for risk assessment of a new pandemic pathogen; 2) investment in essential capabilities during inter-pandemic periods; and 3) building equity into all stages of the response. We present a typology of potential pathogens and scenarios and describe the evidence assessment process and core capabilities required for countries to respond fluidly, equitably, and effectively to a rapidly emerging pandemic threat.
2020年，新西兰与许多其他国家一样，凭借基于流感的大流行计划应对新冠疫情。该国迅速做出调整，对严重急性呼吸综合征冠状病毒2（SARS-CoV-2）大流行采取了极具战略意义且有效的消除应对措施。然而，疫情应对的实施受到大流行防范漏洞的阻碍。这些漏洞削弱了应对措施的有效性，加剧了新冠疾病及防控措施造成的不公平影响。我们的综述审视了对新冠疫情的应对情况，反思其优势、局限性以及对大流行规划的启示。我们确定了三个关键改进领域：1）制定针对新大流行病原体风险评估的系统化程序；2）在两次大流行期间对基本能力进行投资；3）在应对的各个阶段纳入公平性考量。我们提出了潜在病原体和情景的类型，并描述了各国为灵活、公平且有效地应对迅速出现的大流行威胁所需的证据评估过程和核心能力。
