Intention and awareness in perceptual identification priming.

We show that inferences can be made about differences in retrieval intentionality between direct and indirect tests, even when those tests involve different physical cues. When the presence of old items was not mentioned (indirect test condition), we observed a crossed double dissociation between perceptual identification priming and recognition memory as a function of a manipulation of data-driven versus conceptually driven processing at encoding. When subjects were instructed to use their memory to help them identify test items (intentional retrieval condition), priming could be expressed as a monotonically increasing function of recognition memory performance. This reversed association (Dunn & Kirsner, 1988) between priming and recognition memory cannot be accommodated by a model that views intentional retrieval as common to the tests and attributes the crossed double dissociation to an intertest difference in physical cues and associated processes. A posttest questionnaire measure indicated that awareness of the presence of previously encountered items was ubiquitous among indirect test subjects. Crossed double dissociations between direct and indirect measures can therefore be ascribed to differences in retrieval intentionality but not necessarily to differences in subjective awareness of the past.