Young J Q, Coffman J M
Center for the Health Professions, University of California, San Francisco (UCSF), School of Medicine, USA.
West J Med. 1998 May;168(5):428-36.
In this article, we examine the financing mechanisms for graduate medical education (GME) in the United States. In so doing, we identify Medicare as the single largest contributor to GME and the most important barrier to producing a physician workforce that is appropriately sized, balanced, and skilled. Until passage of the 1997 Budget Reconciliation Agreement, the structure of Medicare payments promoted overproduction and skewed production toward training specialists in tertiary settings. We then examine the various reform proposals put forward by major health care organizations and policy bodies. These organizations generally agree on seven policy objectives: Remove incentives that promote expanded resident production; Base the GME subsidy on actual costs and distribute it more uniformly; Focus reductions on specialty residency positions; Provide GME payments for training provided in ambulatory, community, and managed care sites; Decouple Medicare GME reimbursement from payments to health maintenance organizations for patient care; Require all health insurers to contribute to GME; and Ensure that reductions in the GME subsidy do not reduce access to care for low-income persons. A myriad of different mechanisms for achieving these objectives have been recommended, many of which could be melded together to form a comprehensive approach to GME reform. The prospects for meaningful GME reform are dim in the absence of broader Medicare reform. The costs to stake-holders are too concentrated while the benefits to the public are too diffuse for GME reform to stand alone. But the political imperative to deal with the federal budget's short-term deficit and Medicare's long-term solvency will likely create an opportunity for GME reform. An addendum has been added that shows how the 1997 Budget Reconciliation Agreement addresses most of the major reform objectives identified but that several important issues remain unresolved.
在本文中,我们研究了美国毕业后医学教育(GME)的融资机制。在此过程中,我们确定医疗保险是GME的最大单一贡献者,也是培养规模适度、平衡且技能娴熟的医师队伍的最重要障碍。在1997年《预算协调协议》通过之前,医疗保险支付结构助长了生产过剩,并使生产向三级医疗机构的专科培训倾斜。然后,我们研究了主要医疗保健组织和政策机构提出的各种改革建议。这些组织通常在七个政策目标上达成一致:消除促进住院医师数量增加的激励措施;根据实际成本提供GME补贴并更均匀地分配;重点减少专科住院医师职位;为门诊、社区和管理式医疗场所提供的培训支付GME费用;将医疗保险GME报销与向健康维护组织支付的患者护理费用脱钩;要求所有健康保险公司为GME做出贡献;确保GME补贴的减少不会减少低收入人群获得医疗服务的机会。为实现这些目标推荐了无数不同的机制,其中许多机制可以融合在一起,形成GME改革的综合方法。如果没有更广泛的医疗保险改革,有意义的GME改革前景黯淡。利益相关者的成本过于集中,而对公众的好处过于分散,以至于GME改革无法单独进行。但是,应对联邦预算短期赤字和医疗保险长期偿付能力的政治紧迫性可能会为GME改革创造机会。已添加一个附录,说明1997年《预算协调协议》如何解决所确定的大多数主要改革目标,但仍有几个重要问题尚未解决。