Bauch Chris T, Earn David J D
Department of Mathematics and Statistics, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada N1G 2W1.
Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A. 2004 Sep 7;101(36):13391-4. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0403823101. Epub 2004 Aug 25.
Voluntary vaccination policies for childhood diseases present parents with a subtle challenge: if a sufficient proportion of the population is already immune, either naturally or by vaccination, then even the slightest risk associated with vaccination will outweigh the risk from infection. As a result, individual self-interest might preclude complete eradication of a vaccine-preventable disease. We show that a formal game theoretical analysis of this problem leads to new insights that help to explain human decision-making with respect to vaccination. Increases in perceived vaccine risk will tend to induce larger declines in vaccine uptake for pathogens that cause more secondary infections (such as measles and pertussis). After a vaccine scare, even if perceived vaccine risk is greatly reduced, it will be relatively difficult to restore prescare vaccine coverage levels.
如果有足够比例的人口已经通过自然感染或接种疫苗获得免疫，那么即使与接种疫苗相关的风险微乎其微，也会超过感染疾病的风险。因此，个人的自身利益可能会阻碍疫苗可预防疾病的彻底根除。我们表明，对这个问题进行正式的博弈论分析会带来新的见解，有助于解释人们在疫苗接种方面的决策。对于会引发更多二次感染的病原体（如麻疹和百日咳），人们对疫苗风险感知的增加往往会导致疫苗接种率更大幅度的下降。在疫苗恐慌之后，即使人们对疫苗风险的感知大幅降低，恢复恐慌前的疫苗接种覆盖率水平也会相对困难。
