Miller Nolan H
John F. Kennedy School of Government, 79 J.F. Kennedy Street L103, Harvard University, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA.
J Health Econ. 2005 Sep;24(5):931-49. doi: 10.1016/j.jhealeco.2005.03.001.
We study the role of health benefits in an employer's compensation strategy, given the overall goal of minimizing total compensation cost (wages plus health-insurance cost). When employees' health status is private information, the employer's basic benefit package consists of a base wage and a moderate health plan, with a generous plan available for an additional charge. We show that in setting the charge for the generous plan, a cost-minimizing employer should act as a monopolist who sells "health plan upgrades" to its workers, and we discuss ways tax policy can encourage efficiency under cost-minimization and alternative pricing rules.
鉴于将总薪酬成本（工资加上医疗保险成本）降至最低的总体目标，我们研究了健康福利在雇主薪酬策略中的作用。当员工的健康状况属于私人信息时，雇主的基本福利套餐包括基本工资和适度的健康计划，额外付费可获得更优厚的计划。我们表明，在设定优厚计划的费用时，追求成本最小化的雇主应扮演向其员工出售“健康计划升级”的垄断者角色，并且我们讨论了税收政策在成本最小化和替代定价规则下如何鼓励提高效率的方法。
