Frank Michael J, Rudy Jerry W, Levy William B, O'Reilly Randall C
Department of Psychology, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309, USA.
Mem Cognit. 2005 Jun;33(4):742-50. doi: 10.3758/bf03195340.
Transitive inference (TI) in animals (e.g., choosing A over C on the basis of knowing that A is better than B and B is better than C) has been interpreted by some as reflecting a declarative logical inference process. We invert this anthropomorphic interpretation by providing evidence that humans can exhibit TI-like behavior on the basis of simpler associative mechanisms that underlie many theories of animal learning. In this study, human participants were trained on a five-pair TI problem (A+B-, B+C-, C+D-, D+E-, E+F-) and, unlike in previous human TI studies, were prevented from becoming explicitly aware of the logical hierarchy, so they could not employ logical reasoning. They were then tested with three problems: B versus D, B versus E, and C versus E. Participants only reliably chose B over E, whereas the other test conditions yielded chance performance. This result is inconsistent with the use of logical reasoning and is instead consistent with an account developed to explain earlier TI studies with rats that found the same pattern of results. In this account, choice performance is based on differential associative strengths across the stimulus items that develop over training, despite equal overt reinforcement.
动物的传递性推理（TI）（例如，基于知道A比B好且B比C好而选择A优于C）被一些人解释为反映了一种陈述性逻辑推理过程。我们通过提供证据来推翻这种拟人化的解释，即人类可以基于许多动物学习理论所依据的更简单的联想机制表现出类似TI的行为。在本研究中，人类参与者接受了一个五对TI问题（A+B-，B+C-，C+D-，D+E-，E+F-）的训练，并且与之前的人类TI研究不同，他们被阻止明确意识到逻辑层次结构，因此无法运用逻辑推理。然后他们接受了三个问题的测试：B对D、B对E和C对E。参与者仅可靠地选择B优于E，而其他测试条件的表现则是随机的。这一结果与使用逻辑推理不一致，而是与为解释早期对大鼠的TI研究而提出的一种解释一致，该研究发现了相同的结果模式。在这种解释中，选择表现基于在训练过程中刺激项目之间不同的联想强度，尽管有相同的明显强化。
