Sergent C, Naccache L
Laboratoire de Psychologie de la Perception (UMR 8158), CNRS, Université Paris Descartes, Paris, France.
Arch Ital Biol. 2012 Jun-Sep;150(2-3):91-106. doi: 10.4449/aib.v150i2.1270.
'What' do we call consciousness? 'When' and 'Where' in the brain do conscious states occur, and 'How' conscious processing and conscious access to a given content work? In the present paper, we present a non-exhaustive overview of each of these 4 major issues, we provide the reader with a brief description of the major difficulties related to these issues, we highlight the current theoretical points of debate, and we advocate for the explanatory power of the "global workspace" model of consciousness (Baars 1989; Dehaene and Naccache 2001; Dehaene, Changeux et al. 2006) which can accommodate for a fairly large proportion of current experimental findings, and which can be used to reinterpret apparent contradictory findings within a single theoretical framework. Most notably, we emphasize the crucial importance to distinguish genuine neural signatures of conscious access from neural events correlated with consciousness but occurring either before ('upstream') or after ('downstream').
我们把意识称作什么？意识状态在大脑的“何时”和“何处”发生，以及意识处理和对给定内容的意识通达是“如何”运作的？在本文中，我们对这四个主要问题中的每一个都进行了非详尽的概述，向读者简要描述了与这些问题相关的主要困难，突出了当前的理论争论点，并主张意识的“全局工作空间”模型（Baars，1989；Dehaene和Naccache，2001；Dehaene、Changeux等人，2006）具有解释力，该模型能够容纳相当一部分当前的实验结果，并且可用于在单一理论框架内重新解释明显相互矛盾的结果。最值得注意的是，我们强调区分意识通达的真正神经特征与与意识相关但发生在（“上游”）之前或（“下游”）之后的神经事件的至关重要性。
