Institut Jean Nicod, IEC-ENS, EHESS, CNRS, Paris, France.
Conscious Cogn. 2013 Mar;22(1):111-22. doi: 10.1016/j.concog.2012.11.012. Epub 2012 Dec 20.
We argue that thought insertion primarily involves a disruption of the sense of ownership for thoughts and that the lack of a sense of agency is but a consequence of this disruption. We defend the hypothesis that this disruption of the sense of ownership stems from a failure in the online integration of the contextual information related to a thought, in particular contextual information concerning the different causal factors that may be implicated in their production. Loss of unity of consciousness, manifested by incoherent subjective experiences is a general phenomenal characteristic of schizophrenia. This loss of coherence has been hypothesized to reflect a generalized deficit of contextual information integration not conveyed by, but related to, a target event. This deficit is manifested across many cognitive domains. We argue that it is also manifested in the process of thinking itself, resulting in causally decontextualized thoughts that are experienced as inserted thoughts.
我们认为，思维插入主要涉及到对思维的所有权感的破坏，而缺乏主体感只是这种破坏的结果。我们捍卫这样一种假设，即这种所有权感的破坏源于与思维相关的上下文信息的在线整合失败，特别是与可能涉及到它们产生的不同因果因素的上下文信息的失败。意识的不统一，表现为不连贯的主观体验，是精神分裂症的一个普遍现象特征。这种不连贯被假设反映了一种普遍的上下文信息整合缺陷，这种缺陷不是由目标事件传达的，但与目标事件相关。这种缺陷在许多认知领域都有表现。我们认为，它也表现在思维本身的过程中，导致因果上非语境化的思维，这些思维被体验为插入的思维。
