Adolphs Ralph
Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci. 2017 Jan 1;12(1):24-31. doi: 10.1093/scan/nsw153.
In this debate with Lisa Feldman Barrett, I defend a view of emotions as biological functional states. Affective neuroscience studies emotions in this sense, but it also studies the conscious experience of emotion ('feelings'), our ability to attribute emotions to others and to animals ('attribution', 'anthropomorphizing'), our ability to think and talk about emotion ('concepts of emotion', 'semantic knowledge of emotion') and the behaviors caused by an emotion ('expression of emotions', 'emotional reactions'). I think that the most pressing challenge facing affective neuroscience is the need to carefully distinguish between these distinct aspects of 'emotion'. I view emotion states as evolved functional states that regulate complex behavior, in both people and animals, in response to challenges that instantiate recurrent environmental themes. These functional states, in turn, can also cause conscious experiences (feelings), and their effects and our memories for those effects also contribute to our semantic knowledge of emotions (concepts). Cross-species studies, dissociations in neurological and psychiatric patients, and more ecologically valid neuroimaging designs should be used to partly separate these different phenomena.
在与丽莎·费尔德曼·巴雷特的这场辩论中，我捍卫一种将情绪视为生物功能状态的观点。情感神经科学从这个意义上研究情绪，但它也研究情绪的有意识体验（“感受”）、我们将情绪归因于他人和动物的能力（“归因”“拟人化”）、我们思考和谈论情绪的能力（“情绪概念”“情绪语义知识”）以及由情绪引发的行为（“情绪表达”“情绪反应”）。我认为情感神经科学面临的最紧迫挑战是需要仔细区分“情绪”的这些不同方面。我将情绪状态视为进化而来的功能状态，它调节人和动物的复杂行为，以应对体现反复出现的环境主题的挑战。反过来，这些功能状态也会引发有意识体验（感受），它们的影响以及我们对这些影响的记忆也有助于我们对情绪的语义知识（概念）。跨物种研究、神经和精神疾病患者的分离情况以及更具生态效度的神经影像学设计应用于部分区分这些不同现象。
