Ratcliffe Matthew, Wilkinson Sam
J Conscious Stud. 2015;22(11-12):246-269.
'Thought insertion' in schizophrenia involves somehow experiencing one's own thoughts as someone else's. Some philosophers try to make sense of this by distinguishing between ownership and agency: one still experiences oneself as the owner of an inserted thought but attributes it to another agency. In this paper, we propose that thought insertion involves experiencing thought contents as alien, rather than episodes of thinking. To make our case, we compare thought insertion to certain experiences of 'verbal hallucination' and show that they amount to different descriptions of the same phenomenon: a quasi-perceptual experience of thought content. We add that the agency/ownership distinction is unhelpful here. What requires explanation is not why a person experiences a type of intentional state without the usual sense of agency, but why she experiences herself as the agent of one type of intentional state rather than another. We conclude by sketching an account of how this might happen.
精神分裂症中的“思维插入”涉及以某种方式将自己的思维体验为他人的思维。一些哲学家试图通过区分所有权和能动性来理解这一现象：一个人仍然将自己体验为插入思维的所有者，但将其归因于另一个能动性主体。在本文中，我们提出思维插入涉及将思维内容体验为异己的，而不是思维过程。为了阐述我们的观点，我们将思维插入与“言语幻觉”的某些体验进行比较，并表明它们是对同一现象的不同描述：一种对思维内容的准感知体验。我们补充说，在这里能动性/所有权的区分并无帮助。需要解释的不是为什么一个人会在没有通常的能动性感觉的情况下体验到一种意向状态，而是为什么她将自己体验为一种意向状态而非另一种意向状态的主体。我们最后概述了这种情况可能发生的方式。
