Kastrup Bernardo
Independent Scholar, Veldhoven, The Netherlands.
Eur J Psychol. 2017 Aug 31;13(3):559-572. doi: 10.5964/ejop.v13i3.1388. eCollection 2017 Aug.
Depth psychology finds empirical validation today in a variety of observations that suggest the presence of causally effective mental processes outside conscious experience. I submit that this is due to misinterpretation of the observations: the subset of consciousness called "meta-consciousness" in the literature is often mistaken for consciousness proper, thereby artificially creating space for an "unconscious." The implied hypothesis is that all mental processes may in fact be conscious, the appearance of unconsciousness arising from our dependence on self-reflective introspection for gauging awareness. After re-interpreting the empirical data according to a philosophically rigorous definition of consciousness, I show that two well-known phenomena corroborate this hypothesis: (a) experiences that, despite being conscious, aren't re-represented during introspection; and (b) dissociated experiences inaccessible to the executive ego. If consciousness is inherent to all mentation, it may be fundamental in nature, as opposed to a product of particular types of brain function.
深度心理学如今在各种观察中得到了实证验证，这些观察表明在意识体验之外存在具有因果效力的心理过程。我认为这是由于对这些观察的错误解读：文献中所称的“元意识”这一意识子集常常被误认为是真正的意识，从而人为地为“无意识”创造了空间。隐含的假设是，所有心理过程实际上可能都是有意识的，无意识的表象源于我们依赖自我反思的内省来衡量意识。在根据哲学上严谨的意识定义重新解释实证数据后，我表明有两个著名的现象证实了这一假设：(a) 尽管是有意识的体验，但在内省过程中并未被再次表征；(b) 执行自我无法触及的解离体验。如果意识是所有心理活动所固有的，那么它在本质上可能是基本的，而不是特定类型脑功能的产物。
